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I. PREFACE
Historically, American tort law has honored a basic axiom: as
a condition to recovery, plaintiffs must prove that their injuries
resulted from some act or omission of a particular defendant.
Plaintiffs either prove that it is "more likely than not" that an
identified defendant caused their injuries-and then they may re-
cover their full damages-or else they fail to do so and recover
nothing.' This principle was a "bedrock rule" of American tort
law-until approximately 60 years ago, when the California Su-
preme Court flatly rejected it to preclude a particularly inequita-
ble result. At that time, in the landmark case of Summers v. Tice,
the principles of "alternative liability" were born.2 Although it can
be argued that "justice" was served in Summers, it can also be
argued that Summers represented the first step onto a "slippery
slope"-one which threatens to end the centuries-old tradition
1. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at
264 (5th ed. 1984) ("As a practical matter legal responsibility must be limited to those
causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such significance that the
law is justified in imposing liability. Some boundary must be set to liability for the
consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy."). The
identification element of causation-in-fact serves an important function in tort law.
Besides assigning blame-worthiness to culpable parties, it also limits the scope of po-
tential liability and thereby encourages useful activity that would otherwise be de-
terred if there were excessive exposure to liability. David A. Fischer, Products
Liability-An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1623, 1628-29
(1981); Richard 0. Faulk, "Absolute Liability". Historical Perspectives and Political
Alternatives, 37 OKLA. L. REV. 569 (1984).
2. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). In this case, the plaintiff suffered an eye injury when
two hunters negligently fired shots in his direction. At trial, it was undisputed that
one of the two hunters injured the plaintiff. The plaintiff, however, could not establish
which of the hunter's conduct caused the injury. The trial court held both hunters
liable and the hunters appealed arguing that they could not both be liable because
they had not acted in concert. In upholding the trial court's judgment, California's
Supreme Court found (1) it inequitable that the hunter who caused plaintiffs injury
would escape liability, and (2) it was equally probable either one of the two hunters
was responsible for the injury. Id. at 4. To resolve this inequity, the court shifted the
burden of proving identifying the wrongdoer from the innocent plaintiff to the culpa-
ble hunters leaving each of them to "absolve himself if he can." Id.
2008] 149
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that requires individual culpability of a specific defendant as a
prerequisite to recovery-or, to put it more informally, that imper-
ils the principle that tort defendants are "innocent until proven
guilty."3
These exceptions to the causation requirement arose from
competing tort interests, namely the perceived need to compen-
sate innocently injured plaintiffs, and the belief that the costs of
such injuries are best allocated to defendants that have the re-
sources (or insurance) to pay for them. To further the "compensa-
tory" interest, new "alternative" theories of liability were created
as exceptions to the historical rule. Under these theories, the bur-
den of proof is "shifted" from plaintiffs to require defendants to
establish a negative, namely, that their conduct or product did not
cause the plaintiffs' injuries. These exceptions are sometimes re-
ferred to as "alternative liability," "enterprise" liability, and "mar-
ket share" liability, 4 but by any name, they embody a principle
that is precisely the opposite of the "bedrock" rules upon which the
common law of torts was founded.
The principle of "alternative liability" was born of "extraordi-
nary circumstances" very similar to res ipsa loquitur.5 It was cre-
3. The authors are well aware that the principle that a defendant is "innocent
until proven guilty" is specifically applicable to criminal law, rather than civil law.
Nevertheless, the analogy to that principle is particularly apt when discussing "alter-
native liability." Indeed, the only meaningful difference between the concept of "guilt"
in the criminal law and "liability" in civil law is the degree of proof required to estab-
lish culpability. Criminal law typically requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" as
a prerequisite to a finding of guilt, whereas civil law typically requires proof by a
"preponderance of the evidence." Otherwise, however, the burden of proving criminal
or civil liability has always rested upon the person seeking to impose it-something
entirely different from the concept of "alternative liability," where the burden is en-
tirely shifted to the defendants to exculpate themselves. Accordingly, the authors be-
lieve the analogy to the traditional criminal law principle is especially valuable, even
if it is, as some may think, somewhat polemical in this context.
4. "Concerted action" or "concert of action" collective liability is often listed as an
alternative theory of liability. However, this paper does not address "concert of action"
because it is a theory of joint liability involving two or more defendants who had an
understanding, express or tacit, to participate in a common plan to commit a tortious
act. The agreement is almost conspiratorial in nature. Thus, each.is held responsible
jointly for the acts of only one of them. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307,
1327 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §876); see also Tidier v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (applying District of Columbia and Ma-
ryland law); Shackil v. Lederle Labs., 561 A.2d 511 ( N.J. 1989). This theory does not
address the situation where a plaintiff is unable to identify the manufacturer of the
product that allegedly caused the harm or injury that is the basis for proving
causation.
5. Res ipsa loquitur allows a plaintiff to establish negligence by circumstantial
evidence when the direct evidence concerning the cause of injury is primarily within
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss1/4
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ated in a case where there was no dispute that the plaintiff was
injured by one of the defendant's conduct (i.e., the existence of a
"signature injury") and where all of the potentially responsible
parties were before the court. Despite its original limitations, the
allure of shifting the burden of proof from themselves onto defend-
ants has proven irresistible to some plaintiffs' counsel. Despite the
"slippery slope" associated with this amorphous principle, some
courts have also followed the temptation of following these rules-
at the clear risk of making the exception "swallow the rule."
Today, the pressure and temptation to expand the use of al-
ternative theories of liability have arisen most prominently in
cases involving lead paint, including those based upon public nui-
sance claims. In those cases, governmental plaintiffs readily ad-
mit that they cannot prove which defendant's product caused the
alleged nuisance, thus leaving juries to speculate as to the degree
to which, if any, a defendant's conduct caused harm.6 Faced with
this otherwise insurmountable barrier to recovery, these towns,
cities and states appeal to emotions - claiming that lead paint
presents a public health crisis that affects young and innocent
children. Although the federal government and many states have
enacted legislation to deal with lead in old paint,7 plaintiffs still
the knowledge and control of defendant. In order to take advantage of the inference,
the plaintiff "must show that he was injured (1) in an occurrence which would not
have occurred in the absence of negligence, (2) by an instrumentality or agency under
the management or control of the defendant, and (3) under circumstances which were
not due to any voluntary act or negligence on the part of the plaintiff." Smith v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 339 (Ill. 1990).
6. See Thomas J. Graves, States Should Reject Attempts to Expand Pro-Plaintiff
Liability Theory 5 WASH. LEGAL FOUND. 15 (June 30, 1995) (citing Santiago v. Sher-
win-Williams Company, 782 F. Supp. 186, 193 (D. Mass. 1992)).
7. See Pub. L. No. 91-695, 84 Stat. 2078 (1971) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4801)
(passing the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act ("LPPPA") through which
Congress banned the use of lead-based paint in residential structures constructed or
rehabilitated by the federal government); Lead-Containing Paint and Certain Con-
sumer Products Bearing Lead-Containing Paint, 42 Fed. Reg. 44192 (Sept. 1, 1977)
(banning lead-based paint); Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672 (1992) (passing the
Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act); Lead; Identification of Danger-
ous Levels of Lead, 66 FED. REG. 1206, 1206 (Jan. 5, 2001) (final rule); Lead; Require-
ments for disclosure of Known Lead-Based Paint and/or Lead-Based Paint Hazards in
Housing, 61 FED. REG. 9064 (March 6, 1996) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 745, subpart F
and 24 C.F.R. pt. 35, subpart H) (promulgating EPA's Lead Rule). See also ARiz. REV.
STAT. § 36-1674 (1996); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 17920.10(a) (West 2002) ;
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-7-1101 (1997); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. §§ 19a-111-1, 19a-
111-4, 21a-82(a) (1992); DEL. CODE REGS. § 40 700 003 (Weil 1978); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 31-41-14 (1994); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/2, 45/9 (1973); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 641-
68.5 (2004); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 211.905 (West 1974); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 1299:27 (1973); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 111, § 197 (1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
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argue that judicial assistance is necessary to protect these chil-
dren because neither the states, the cities, nor private plaintiffs
have sufficient resources to solve the crisis themselves.
Following that "slippery slope," plaintiffs further claim that,
as between the innocent plaintiffs and the paint manufacturers,
the manufacturers are in a superior position to absorb the costs of
abatement. Such arguments are made notwithstanding the fact
that the manufacturers did nothing to permit or promote the de-
cades of neglect and inadequate maintenance by landowners that
ultimately produced the alleged exposures, and notwithstanding
the frequent absence of these otherwise culpable parties from the
lawsuits.8 Moreover, the plaintiffs assert that the courts should
ignore their state's legislative and regulatory efforts because they
are pursuing a "common law" remedy, not relief regulated or gov-
erned by statute. Supposedly, the court's "flexible" common law
powers remain unaffected by public policies promulgated by the
executive and legislative branches, especially when plaintiffs seek
equitable relief, such as abatement orders in lieu of money dam-
ages. When damages are involved-and perhaps even when an eq-
uitable remedy is requested 9-plaintiffs have sought alternative
theories of liability known as "market share" liability. Under this
theory, a simple showing that "lead is harmful" may result in a
ruling that every defendant who was sued is presumed responsi-
ble for creating the hazard that is supposedly injuring children-
unless each respective defendant can prove their innocence.
tit. 22, § 1321 (1973); MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 6-819 (West 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 111, § 197 (1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.9504 (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 701.300,
701.308 (West 1993); N.H. ADMIN. R. ANN. He-P 1613.02 (1995); N.J. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 51-1.3, 51-6.1 (2005); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1373 (1970); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 130A-131.7, 130A-131.9C (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3742.37, 3742.38 (West
1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-1430 (1993); VT. CODE R. § 13-140-054 (1994); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 254.11, 254.166 (West 1993).
8. Indeed, in one recent trial in Rhode Island, the plaintiff (State of Rhode Is-
land) actually opposed the joinder of landlords and property owners in the trial
against the paint manufacturers-despite Rhode Island's clear regulatory mandate
that recognizes that such persons are primarily responsible for preventing lead expo-
sures in their properties. R.I. GEN LAW §§23-24.6-11.1(a), 23-24.6-21.3(b) & (c). (2005);
see also R.I. Lead Hazard Mitigation Regulations §§ 5.1 & 9 (2003). Incredibly, the
trial court agreed with this argument and severed the manufacturers' claims against
the landlords and property owners from the proceedings. Rhode Island v. Lead Indus.
Ass'n, Inc., No. 99-5226, 2004 WL 4963044 (R.I. Super. Mar. 22, 2004).
9. The allocation of liability in equity is a largely unexplored field, and it is by no
means clear that plaintiffs will not seek to expand "market share" liability principles
to shift proof requirements in those proceedings as well.
152 [Vol. 25
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Although these arguments are certainly appealing emotion-
ally, their allure creates extraordinary dangers. In fact, these gov-
ernmental plaintiffs (often represented by private counsel who
themselves possess substantial resources to prosecute the actions)
are not asking courts merely to take a small step further along an
already "slippery slope." Instead, they are asking the court to leap
into an unknown abyss where all defendants are assumed
guilty-even if the presence of their product cannot be shown to
have any connection with the injury. In this "ends justify the
means" argument, the governmental plaintiffs seek to force an en-
tire industry into the role of unfunded underwriters of judicially-
created insurance.
This article examines various theories of alternative liability
and the circumstances, policies and limitations under which they
were created and expanded. It then specifically examines the ap-
plication of "market share" liability to the manufacturers of lead
pigment currently being sued by governmental entities under the-
ories of public nuisance. Finally, it demonstrates how these theo-
ries are unworkable in the context of the lead paint public
nuisance litigation. Viewed in the proper perspective, it is time to
stop the descent of American jurisprudence down the "slippery
slope" of alternative liability-lest the uncontrolled descent lead
to a precipitous fall into an irrational and unjust abyss.
II. THEORIES OF ALTERNATIVE LIABILITY
A. The Beginning: Summers v. Tice
In the case of Summers v. Tice, California's Supreme Court
held that two hunters each acted tortiously by firing their guns in
the plaintiffs direction-because it was equally probable that ei-
ther one was responsible.10 In Summers, the plaintiff went hunt-
ing with the two defendants. He specifically cautioned them to
stay in line and be careful, but when a bird was flushed, both de-
fendants fired at it even though the plaintiff was directly in the
line of fire and clearly visible. Summers was hit once in the eye
and once in the lip. It was undisputed that one of the two hunters
caused the plaintiffs injury, but the plaintiff could not prove
which defendant injured him.1 ' Normally, this failure of proof
would have been fatal to plaintiffs claim, but the Summers court
decided to create new law-instead of letting the innocent plain-
10. 199 P.2d at 2-3.
11. See id. at 4.
20081 153
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tiff go uncompensated and the negligent defendants go unpun-
ished. Under these extraordinary circumstances, the court
relieved the plaintiff of his burden to prove which defendant
caused his injury and held that both defendants were jointly and
severally liable for his injuries unless one of them could prove that
he did not cause the injury. 12 This holding effectively shifted the
burden of identifying the negligent defendant (proving "guilt")
from the plaintiff to the defendants. As a matter of law, defend-
ants in such "extraordinary circumstances" now had to "prove
their innocence."
In Summers, the court crafted this alternative theory of liabil-
ity based on its belief that it would be unfair for the culpable de-
fendant(s) to escape liability simply because the plaintiff, through
no fault of his own, was unable to prove which of the two defend-
ants injured him. Because both hunters fired their gun in the
plaintiffs direction, the court decided that it was more equitable
to put the loss on the culpable hunters rather than on the innocent
plaintiff. It reasoned that both defendants "brought about a situa-
tion where the negligence of one of them injured the plaintiff,
hence, it should rest with them each to absolve himself if he
can."13
This doctrine of "alternative liability" is now embodied in sec-
tion 433B(3) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The Restate-
ment notes that the policy underlying the shifting burden is "the
injustice of permitting proved wrongdoers .. .to escape liability
merely because the nature of their conduct and the resulting harm
has made it difficult or impossible to prove which of them caused
the harm."14 Courts have applied this form of alternative liability
in cases where defendants' conduct was simultaneous in time, was
of the same character, and created the same risk of harm, and
where all potential tortfeasors were joined as defendants. 15
12. Id. at 5.
13. Id. at 4.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) cmt. f (1965) (emphasis omitted).
15. See id. at cmt. h. But see Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 172 (Mich.
1984) (holding that DES plaintiffs could rely on alternative liability even though con-
tested issue over whether plaintiffs had sued all potential tortfeasors and where al-
leged tortious activity occurred over period of 20 years).
[Vol. 25154
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B. "Enterprise" Liability: "Industry-wide Liability"
"Enterprise" liability, also termed "industry-wide liability,"16
originated in 1972 in Hall v. E.L Du Pont de Nemours & Co.' 7 In
Hall, 13 children were injured in separate exploding blasting cap
accidents. They sued six manufacturers (comprising virtually the
entire blasting cap industry of the United States) and their trade
association. The evidence showed that the defendants (1) adhered
to an industry-wide safety standard, (2) delegated safety functions
(design and investigation) to the their trade association, and (3)
adopted an industry-wide design and manufacture of blasting
caps. 18 Plaintiffs alleged that defendants' failure to place warn-
ings on individual blasting caps created an unreasonable risk of
harm. They further asserted that defendants knew of the high in-
cidence of injury to children and consciously agreed not to place
warnings on the caps. Defendants moved to dismiss on the ground
that the complaint did not identify the specific manufacturer that
caused any particular injury.
The Hall court held that "Plaintiffs' allegations of joint knowl-
edge and action raised issues of fact and law sufficient to defeat
dismissal."'19 It focused on three issues: (1)defendants' joint con-
trol of the risk; (2) the assignment of costs to those most able to
reduce them; and (3) providing a remedy to innocent plaintiffs. 20
It reasoned that the burden of proving proximate cause should be
relaxed where all manufacturers followed an industry-wide safety
standard, delegated all safety functions to the trade association
and explicitly cooperated in the manufacture and design of the
blasting caps if the plaintiffs eventually demonstrate "defendants'
joint awareness of the risks at issue in this case and their joint
capacity to reduce or affect those risks."2 ' Under "enterprise"
liability,
the industry-wide standard becomes itself the cause of plaintiffs
injury, just as defendants' joint plan is a cause of injury in the
traditional "concert of action" plea. Each defendant's adherence
perpetuates this standard, which results in the manufacture of
the particular, unidentifiable injury-producing product. There-
16. See, e.g., Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183, 187 (S.D.Ga.
1982); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Mo. 1984).
17. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
18. Id. at 359, 375.
19. Id. at 386.
20. See id. at 371.
21. Id. at 378.
20081
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fore, each industry member has contributed to plaintiff's
injury.22
Since the Hall decision, "Enterprise liability ... has been re-
jected by virtually all jurisdictions that have considered this
concept."23
The prominent reason for declining recovery under this theory
is its limited application to cases that involve only a small num-
ber of manufacturers in a highly centralized industry. The Hall
court recognized this limitation and stated '[wihat would be fair
and feasible with regard to an industry of five or ten producers
might be manifestly unreasonable if applied to a decentralized
industry composed of thousands of small producers.' 24
Courts have also rejected "enterprise" liability because of its
"inability to prove the defendants collectively controlled their con-
duct by jointly imposed safety standards."25
C. "Market Share" Liability
Another alternative liability theory plaintiffs attempt to pur-
sue is "market share" liability. "Market share" liability imposes
pro rata liability in the ratio of the market share of each manufac-
turer of fungible products that are so generic that individual man-
ufacturers cannot be identified. 26 When a court applies this
alternative theory of liability, it shifts the burden of proof from the
plaintiff to the defendant-manufacturers, requiring them to prove
that they did not manufacture the offending product.
22. Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924, 935 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
912 (1980).
23. Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Tex. 1989) (citing Mulcahy v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 70-71 (Iowa 1986); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d
368, 380 (Wash. 1984); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Mo. 1984);
Sindell, 607 P.2d at 935; Cummins v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 495 A.2d 963, 971
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 427 A.2d 1121, 1129 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) ("Adoption of this legal theory would, of necessity, result in
total abandonment of the well-settled principle that manufacturers are responsible
only for damages caused by a defective product upon proof that the defective product
was defective and that the defect arose while the product was in the control of
defendant.").
24. Gaulding, 772 S.W.2d at 70 (quoting Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 378).
25. Id. (citing Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 71 (Iowa 1986); Sindell,
607 P.2d at 935; Cummins, 495 A.2d at 970-71).
26. Donald G. Gifford, Market Share Liability Beyond DES Cases: The Solution to
the Causation Dilemma in Lead Paint Litigation?, 58 S.C. L. REV. 115, 117 (2006).
[Vol. 25
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1. "Market Share" Liability was Created to
Accommodate DES Plaintiffs
The alternative theory of liability known, as "market share"
liability was crafted by California's Supreme Court in 1980 in
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,27 to accommodate the needs of
plaintiffs allegedly injured by their mother's in-utero exposure to
the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES). DES cases often presented
problems of proof for a plaintiff-namely identifying the product
source. The length of time between exposure and discovery of in-
jury was often in excess of 20 years-making it difficult for the
plaintiff to locate witnesses and for those witnesses to recall facts
with certainty. 28 "Pharmacists many times did not know who
manufactured the DES they purchased because the chain of distri-
bution went from manufacturer to wholesaler to pharmacist, and
in its generic form, records of the particular manufacturer were
not kept or have been destroyed. The plaintiffs mother and her
pharmacist often have no recollection of the color, size or manufac-
turer of the DES [she] ingested while pregnant .... -29 Given the
sheer number of DES manufacturers marketing generic versions
of DES, it was often a daunting task to show which defendant
manufactured and sold the DES responsible for the plaintiffs
injuries.
In Sindell, the plaintiffs brought a class action against 11
drug manufacturers, alleging that defendants were jointly liable
because they had acted in concert to produce, market, and pro-
mote DES as a safe and effective drug for preventing miscar-
riages.30 The trial court dismissed the claims because the
plaintiffs' were unable to identify the defendants that manufac-
tured the DES responsible for their specific injuries. In reversing
the decision, California's Supreme Court declined to apply any of
the then-existing theories of collective liability and held Summers
inapplicable because all potential tortfeasors had not been
27. 607 P.2d 924. DES was a synthetic estrogen hormone that was marketed to
women as a miscarriage preventative from 1947-1971. During that time hundreds of
pharmaceutical companies produced the drug because it was never patented. Naomi
Sheiner, Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM
L. REV. 963, 963-64, 963 n.1 (1978). In 1971, a link was discovered between fetal
exposure to DES and the development many years later of certain rare forms of cervi-
cal and vaginal cancer. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 925, 927.
28. See McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265, 267 (D.S.D. 1983).
29. Id. at 267-68 (footnotes omitted).
30. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 925.
2008]
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joined.31 "Concert of action" was not available because these plain-
tiffs had merely alleged defendants' parallel action, rather than a
tacit understanding or a common plan.32 The court also held that
"enterprise" liability was unsuitable because of the large number
of DES manufacturers and defendants' lack of joint control over
the risk of harm.33 Nonetheless, stressing the gravity of the in-
jury, the court observed that in a "contemporary complex industri-
alized society, advances in science and technology create fungible
goods which may harm consumers and which cannot be traced to
any specific producer."34 Declining to apply traditional tort princi-
ples, the court instead chose to once again expand "alternative lia-
bility" and created what is now known as "market share"
liability. 35
2. The Policy Considerations for "Market Share"
Liability
The Sindell court based its decision on two policy considera-
tions. First, assuming for purposes of appeal that all defendants
were negligent, the court adopted the Summers rationale that "as
between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter
should bear the cost of the injury."36 Second, it reasoned that if
manufacturers were held liable, this would create an incentive to
produce safer products. 37 Specifically, the court concluded that
drug manufacturers were in the best position to warn the public of
side effects and dangers associated with taking drugs because the
31. Id. at 930-31. Unlike Summers, the Sindell defendants came from a large ill-
defined class of companies the produced DES for a variety of uses under at least 70
trade names. Id. at 928 n.6. According to the court, there was "no rational basis on
which to infer" that any defendant supplied the DES at issue. Id. at 931. Thus, the
court concluded that it would be unfair to require each defendant to exonerate itself
when there was a real possibility that the actual supplier of DES to Sindell's mother
was not before the court. Id. at 931.
32. See id. at 933. The court rejected this theory because Food and Drug Adminis-
tration ("FDA") regulations require drug companies to pool their clinical data. They
also require companies to use the same standard to insure that each company's DES
was chemically identical. See Sheiner, supra note 27, at 975-78 (describing drug in-
dustry practices in general). Consequently, the court refused to imply a "concert of
action" simply because the defendants complied with federal regulations. Sindell, 607
P.2d at 935.
33. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 935. The Sindell Court likewise observed that it
would be unfair to impose liability on an industry simply because they were required
to adhere to FDA standards. Id.
34. Id. at 936.
35. Id. at 936-37.
36. Id. at 936.
37. Id.
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consumer is virtually incapable of recognizing and protecting
themselves against any defects. 38
The court thought it reasonable, under the circumstances, "to
measure the likelihood that any of the defendants supplied the
[offending] product" by each defendant's share of the DES mar-
ket.39 Furthermore, by apportioning liability according to market
share, "each manufacturer's liability for an injury would be ap-
proximately equivalent to the damage caused by the DES it
manufactured."40
Although this theory has superficial appeal-distributing lia-
bility among many potentially culpable defendants-it ignores
fundamental fairness and increases overall costs in an effort to
join a substantial share of the market. 41 It also failed to provide
much needed guidance on some fundamental issues. For example,
the Sindell court failed to identify the relevant market for pur-
poses of determining a particular defendant's market share (i.e.,
local, countywide, statewide or national). A defendant's liability
will vary widely depending on which market is used and this un-
certainty undermines the court's claim that "market share" liabil-
ity approximates each defendant's responsibility for the injuries
caused by its own products. 42 The decision also failed "to specify
how the market for DES can be allocated fairly when DES has
been prescribed for uses other than as a miscarriage prevent-
ative."43 The Sindell court never explained what constitutes a
38. Id.
39. Id. at 937.
40. Id. at 938.
41. "Acceptance of market share liability and the concomitant burden placed on
the courts and the parties will imprudently bog down the judiciary in an almost futile
endeavor. This would also create a tremendous cost, both monetarily and in terms of
the workload, on the court system and litigants in an attempt to establish market
share percentages based on unreliable or insufficient data." Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
560 N.E.2d at 338 (citing Fischer, supra note 1, at 1657). See also Fischer supra note
1, 1657 ("The legal fees and administrative costs arising from litigation of this magni-
tude easily could rival the cost of the plaintiffs judgment."); Jonathan B. Newcomb,
Comment, Market Share Liability for Defective Products: An Ill-Advised Remedy for
the Problem of Identification, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 300, 323-26 (1981). Use of "market
share" liability increases administrative costs because manufacturers have to defend
themselves in multiple suits including those in which their product was not the actual
cause of any injuries. Richard P. Murray, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories: A Market
Share Approach to DES Causation, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1179, 1188 n.51 (1981).
42. Fischer, supra note 1, at 1643-44.
43. See Miller & Hancock, Perspectives on Market Share Liability: Time for a Re-
assessment?, 88 W.VA. L. REV. 81, 89 n.46 (1985); David J. Murray, Note, The DES
Causation Conundrum: A Functional Analysis, 32 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 939, 959-61
(1987).
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"substantial share" of the market, sufficient to shift the burden of
proof to the defendant. The law review article that influenced the
court suggested that a plaintiff join 75 to 80 percent of the manu-
facturers, 44 but the court rejected this as too high and held that
only a substantial percentage is required.45 "In order to calculate
market shares, the scope of the market itself must be defined in
terms of the time period, geographical area covered, and the range
of identifiable product forms included." 46 In the DES litigation,
the only factor used by the court to determine market share was
time-the nine months during which the pregnant mother would
have purchased the DES. If the manufacturer did not sell DES
during that time period, it should be dismissed from the suit.47
This, however, ignores the market share in any given geographi-
cal area where a manufacturer may not market its products or
where a small local producer dominated the local market. With
respect to the relevant product, in DES litigation, it depended on
what the mother remembered. Did she remember taking a pill or a
capsule and did she remember its size, shape or color markings? If
she remembered any details, the size of the market should have
been shrunk to include only those manufacturers who produced
the pill or capsule with the specific characteristics during the nine
months the DES was taken.
3. The Extraordinariness of "Market Share" Liability
In addressing the plight of DES plaintiffs, the courts were
faced with a set of extraordinary circumstances. There was a sig-
nature injury caused by a specific product-cervical and vaginal
cancer directly linked to the drug DES. Thus, there was little dis-
pute about what caused the injury. The dispute was over proof
that a specific defendant manufactured the DES that caused the
injury.
There was a very finite period of time when the injury oc-
curred - the nine month window between conception and birth
when the plaintiffs mother took DES to prevent a miscarriage.
Plaintiffs knew when their mothers took the drug. Therefore, they
knew when the DES was sold. This allowed the court to narrowly
tailor the remedy to the market share of those defendants who
sold DES in the relevant market during the relevant nine-month
44. Sheiner, supra note 27, at 996.
45. Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980).
46. Murray, supra note 41, at 1189.
47. Id.; see Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937.
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window. Additionally, the drug was only produced and marketed
for twenty-four years. 4s
Rightly or wrongly, based on these extraordinary facts (a sig-
nature injury caused by a drug sold during a nine-month window),
some courts have applied the "market share" alternative theory of
liability. Under "market share" liability, the burden of identifica-
tion shifts to the defendants if the plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case on every element of the claim except for identification of
the actual tortfeasor or tortfeasors, and that the plaintiff joined
manufacturers representing a "substantial share" of the market.49
Once these elements are established, each defendant is severally
liable for the portion of the judgment that represented its share of
the market at the time of the injury, unless it proves that it could
not have made the product that caused the plaintiffs harm.50
In deciding whether to adopt a rule of [market share] liability,
courts have considered the following factors: (1) the generic na-
ture of the product; (2) the long latency period of the harm;
(3)the inability of plaintiffs to discover which defendant's prod-
uct caused plaintiffs harm, even after exhaustive discovery; (4)
the clarity of the causal connection between the defective prod-
uct and harm suffered by plaintiffs; (5) the absence of other
medical or environmental factors that could have caused or ma-
terially contributed to the harm; and (6) the availability of suffi-
cient 'market share' data to support a reasonable apportionment
of liability.51
III. MOST COURTS HAVE REJECTED "MARKET
SHARE" LIABILITY
Because the allure of shifting the burden of proof from them-
selves onto defendants, whenever plaintiffs cannot prove causa-
tion or want to increase the number of potentially liable
48. See sources cited supra note 27.
49. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936-37.
50. In Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988), the California Supreme
Court clarified its intention to hold defendants severally, instead of jointly and sever-
ally, liable because joint liability would "frustrate Sindell's goal of achieving a balance
between the interest of DES plaintiffs and manufacturers of the drug." Id. at 487.
51. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp.
2d 348, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIA.nL-
iTY § 15 cmt. c (1998)). See also Richard 0. Faulk & John S. Gray, Reunion in Salam:
Updating the MTBE Controversy, 36 ENV'rL. L. REP. 10667, 10679-80 (2006) (discuss-
ing the federal courts adoption of the "commingled product theory" variation of mar-
ket share liability in MTBE litigation).
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defendants, they ask for this extraordinary relief. Although the
Sindell decision was handed down in California over 25 years ago,
to date only the highest court of five other states have adopted
some form of "market share" liability.52 Three of those five states
adopted it in DES cases,53 one in a DES case and in lead paint
litigation,54 and the other in a case involving a blood product
needed by hemophiliacs. 55 Some federal courts hearing diversity
cases have predicted that the state's supreme court would adopt
"market share" liability56 but most have declined to adopt such a
radical departure from the common law of the state in which each
sits without clear direction from that state's supreme court.57
52. Sindell's concept of "market share" liability has been extensively criticized,
and has been adopted in the same form by only one Federal district court. See McEl-
haney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265, 270-71 (D.S.D. 1983) (applying what it
thought would be South Dakota law).
53. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1075 (N.Y. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989) (adopting "market-share" theory of liability in which DES
defendants are liable in proportion to their share in national market irrespective of
proof that they did not cause the injury, but stressing that "the DES situation is a
singular case, with manufacturers acting in a parallel manner to produce an identi-
cal, generically marketed product, which causes injury many years later, and which
has evoked a legislative response reviving previously barred actions"); Martin v. Ab-
bott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 380 (Wash. 1984) (adopting "modified market share" liabil-
ity, in which plaintiff must join only one defendant who produced or marketed injury-
causing product; burden is then shifted to defendant to prove its percentage share of
market and thereby lower presumptive equal share of market); Conley v. Boyle Drug
Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 285 (Fla. 1990) (due diligence requirement).
54. Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 53 (Wis. 1984), cert. den., 469 U.S.
826 (1984) (adopting modified market-share theory of liability in which each DES de-
fendant is liable in proportion to its "respective contribution" to the result, as mea-
sured by various factors); Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523 (Wis.
2005) (creating a form of "absolute liability" by expanding market share liability to
lead paint litigation and requiring defendants to prove they never sold any paint in
Wisconsin between 1900 and 1978).
55. See Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717 (Haw. 1991).
56. See McElhaney, 564 F. Supp. at 269 (predicting that South Dakota's Supreme
Court would adopt an alternative theory of liability and choosing market share liabil-
ity); McCormack v. Abbott, 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1526 (D. Mass. 1985) (adopting Wash-
ington's version of market share liability which the federal court held was consistent
with Massachusetts court's guidelines in Payton v. Abbott, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass.
1982)).
57. See Tidler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (refusing to
apply "market share" liability to DES manufacturers under the laws of Maryland and
District of Columbia because neither state recognizes "non-identification" theories);
Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589, 596 (D.S.C. 1981) (holding that the applica-
tion of Sindell market-share liability against DES manufacturers would violate public
policy of South Carolina); Lee v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 898 F.2d 146, No. 89-2143,
1990 WL 27325, at *4 (4th Cir. Feb. 27, 1990) (unpublished table decision) (declining
to apply market-share liability because it "directly contravene[s] Maryland tort law,
which requires direct proof that the defendant is liable for the plaintiffs injuries be-
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss1/4
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Many of the states that have addressed "market share" liability
have rejected its application in all cases, including those involving
DES.58
A. "Market Share" Liability Has Been Rejected on Policy
Grounds
As stated above, a plaintiff in a products liability action must
ordinarily prove that a manufacturer or supplier produced or pro-
vided the product or was in some way responsible for the plain-
tiffs injury. This is a bedrock principle of tort law.59 Plaintiffs ask
courts to apply the "market share" theory of liability because it is
one of the few exceptions to the rule that a plaintiff must show a
causal connection between the defendant's product and plaintiffs
injury (i.e., causation in fact). As discussed above, such a theory
allows recovery without proof of which defendant actually manu-
factured or supplied the product alleged to have harmed the plain-
cause the defendant manufactured, distributed, sold, or was otherwise responsible for
or controlled the product."); see also Morton v. Abbott Labs., 538 F. Supp. 593, 599
(M.D. Fla. 1982) ("[Mlarket share theory unquestionably represents a radical depar-
ture from the traditional concept of causation" and there was no indication that Flor-
ida would abandon such a fundamental principle.); Pipon v. Burroughs-Wellcome Co.,
532 F. Supp. 637, 639 (D.N.J. 1982) (finding no indication that the New Jersey Su-
preme Court would deviate from the causation requirement), affd, 696 F.2d 984 (3d
Cir. 1982); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1019 (D.S.C. 1981) (declining to
apply burden shifting theory); Griffin v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 964, 967
(W.D.N.C. 1986) (describing the expansion in tort law requested by plaintiff not as a
"quantum leap, but rather a quantum detour or perhaps knight's move, as it requires
not only a quantum acceleration but also a marked charge in direction as well.");
Wood v. Eli Lilly & Co., 38 F.3d 510, 514 (10th Cir. 1994) (applying Oklahoma law).
58. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYsIcAL HARM § 28 cmt. o
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2007) ("Virtually all courts that have considered the ques-
tion have declined to apply a market-share liability theory to products that are not
fungible and therefore do not pose equivalent risks to all of those exposed to the prod-
ucts."); see also Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1990); Mulcahy v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986); Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co., 696 N.E.2d 187
(Ohio 1998); City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co, 226 S.W.3d 110 (Mo. 2007)
(confirming the continuing vitality of Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241(Mo.
1984), Morton v. Abbott Labs., 538 F. Supp. 593 (M.D. Fla. 1982), Ryan, 514 F. Supp.
1004 (D.S.C. 1981). See also Richard E. Kaye, Annotation, "Concert of Activity," "Alter-
nate Liability," "Enterprise Liability," or Similar Theory as Basis for Imposing Liabil-
ity Upon One or More Manufacturers of Defective Uniform Product, in Absence of
Identification of Manufacturer of Precise Unit or Batch Causing Injury, 63 A.L.R. 5th
195, 225-239, 260-74 (1998) (collecting cases).
59. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d at 328 ("A fundamental principle of tort
law is that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant caused the complained-of harm or injury; mere conjecture or spec-
ulation is insufficient proof.").
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tiff. For some states this is too much of a deviation from
traditional tort law.60
Other states have refused to adopt "market share" liability
because "in one way or another [it] provide[s] plaintiffs recovery of
loss by a kind of court-constructed insurance plan. The result is
that manufacturers are required to pay or contribute to payment
for injuries which their product may not have caused."61 According
to these courts, "awarding damages to an admitted innocent party
by means of a court-constructed device that places liability on
manufacturers who were not proved to have caused the injury in-
volves social engineering more appropriately within the legislative
domain."62 The Restatement (Third) of Torts notes that "[c]rafting
a coherent market-share scheme that both relaxes the traditional
tort requirement of factual causation and provides a workable
market-share system is much more the type of lawmaking tradi-
60. See, e.g., id. at 344-45("We have not in the past been hesitant to develop new
tort concepts; however, in this instance we decline to do so because of the infirmities
in the proposed theory. Furthermore, this is too great a deviation from a tort principle
we have found to serve a vital function in the law, causation in fact, especially when
market share liability is a flawed concept and its application will likely be to only a
narrow class of defendants."); Sutowski, 696 N.E.2d 187; Thompson v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 714 F.2d 581, 583 (5th Cir. 1983) (refusing to apply "market share" liability in
Louisiana diversity case because it represents "radical departure[ ] from traditional
theories of tort liability"); Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., 764 F.2d
1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that "significant policy reasons favor retention of
proximate cause as an essential element of cause of action in asbestos litigation");
Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 247 ("There is insufficient justification at this time to support
abandonment of so fundamental a concept of tort law as the requirement that a plain-
tiff prove, at a minimum, some nexus between wrongdoing and injury."); Case v.
Fibreboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062, 1067 (Okla. 1987) ("the public policy favoring recov-
ery on the part of an innocent plaintiff does not justify the abrogation of the rights of a
potential defendant to have a causative link proven between that defendant's specific
tortious acts and the plaintiffs injuries").
61. Mulcahy, 386 N.W.2d at 76 (Iowa 1986) (emphasis added).
62. Id. See also Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183, 190
(S.D.Ga. 1982) (suggesting that the appropriate institution to address and fashion
remedies for asbestos victims unable to prove which manufacturers' product to which
they were exposed is the legislature); Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 247; Senn v. Merrell-Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 751 P.2d 215, 223 (Or. 1988) (rejecting a theory of market-
share liability against two DPT manufacturers because the "adoption of any theory of
alternative liability requires a profound change in fundamental tort principles,"
which was perceived as more properly in the domain of the legislature); Nutt v. A.C. &
S. Co., 517 A.2d 690, 694 (Del. Super. 1986) (rejecting market-share liability and rec-
ognizing "that such a change in traditional tort law should be left to the legislature").
Cf Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589 (D.S.C. 1981) (relying on Ryan, 514 F.
Supp. 1004, court rejects Sindell market-share theory as choice of law because it vio-
lates South Carolina public policy); Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, Failure
to Identify the Defendant in Tort Law: Towards a Legislative Solution, 73 CAL. L. REv.
941 (1985) (urging that legislatures should be the engine for reform on this issue).
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tionally and appropriately a matter for legislative action than for
common-law decision making."63
A few states have declined to adopt "market share" liability in
drug-related litigation where it perceived "that the imposition of a
theory of collective liability.., would frustrate overarching pub-
lic-policy and public-health considerations by threatening the con-
tinued availability of needed drugs and impairing the prospects of
the development of safer vaccines."64
B. "Market Share" Liability Has Been Rejected Where
There is No "Signature" Injury
Although "alternate liability" also involves wrongful conduct
by more than one party, it is essential that the conduct of one of
the parties must have caused the injury to plaintiff. Under this
theory there can be no dispute that the product made by the de-
fendants caused the plaintiffs injury; the only dispute is over
which defendant manufactured or supplied the injury-causing
product. 65
In DES cases, the "market share" theory succeeded in sepa-
rating wrongdoers from innocent actors, because DES plaintiffs
suffered from a signature DES injury-a rare form of cancer (ade-
nocarcinoma) that was directly attributable to exposure to DES. 66
When other factors or other types of products can cause, or at least
contribute to, the plaintiffs injuries, the plaintiff does not suffer
63. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt.
o (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2007).
64. Shackil v. Lederle Labs., 561 A.2d 511, 512 (N.J. 1989) (rejecting the applica-
tion of market-share liability in diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus ("DPT") vaccine-
related litigation and rejecting the claim that there was a trend toward wholesale
adoption of market-share liability in New Jersey); see also Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
192 Cal. Rptr. 870, 879-80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that if market-share liability
had been generally prevalent during the development of the poliomyelitis vaccine,
manufacturers would have been reluctant to proceed with the distribution of the vac-
cine, and consequently thousands of polio sufferers would not have been saved by the
Salk vaccine program). But see Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332 (C.D.
Cal. 1987) (applying market-share liability against manufacturers of DPT based on
allegations of industry manufacturing defects).
65. Mulcahy, 386 N.W.2d 67, 72 (Iowa 1986) (citing Morton v. Abbott Labs., 538
F. Supp. 593, 598 (M.D. Fla. 1982)); Brenner v. American Cyanamid Co., 699 N.Y.S.2d
848, 854 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (among the reasons for rejecting market-share theory
in a lead paint poisoning case the court included the fact that "there is no signature
injury associated with lead poisoning").
66. See Nancy Lee Firak, The Developing Policy Characteristics of Cause-in-Fact:
Alternative Forms of Liability, Epidemiological Proof and Trans-Scientific Issues, 63
TEMP. L. REV. 311, 334 (1990) ("In the DES cases there is no doubt that DES, and not
a background risk, caused the injuries that the plaintiffs suffered.").
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from a "signature" injury.67 "The public policy reasons favoring
the use of market share do not control where there is a possibility
that the [product of the] defendant[] did not cause the harm in
question."68
C. "Market Share" Liability Has Been Rejected When the
Product at Issue is Not Fungible
Additionally, courts typically refuse to apply "market share"
liability if they determine that the product at issue is not fungi-
ble.69 For example, many courts refused to apply "market share"
liability in asbestos litigation because they concluded that asbes-
tos was not a fungible product.70 A draft of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts explains:
67. Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Company, 782 F. Supp. 186, 192 (D. Mass.
1992), affd, 3 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1993).
68. Id. at 193. See also Case v. Fibreboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Okla. 1987)
("Because the market share liability theory is a theory which eliminates proof of cau-
sation of injury for public policy reasons, it must also be clearly founded in facts which
support the link between the injury suffered and the risk to which plaintiff was ex-
posed. In the DES arena this cause and effect was clear cut. In the application to
asbestos related injuries there are more complications.") (citations omitted); Starling,
533 F.Supp. at 191 (refusing to apply market share in an asbestos case because "[t]he
injuries caused by asbestos exposure are not restricted to asbestos products-other
products, such as cigarettes, may have caused or contributed to the injury.").
69. "Fungibility... is not a term that is capable of being defined with categorical
precision; its character will depend on the context of the injury, its cause and the
particular obstacles encountered in linking the causation to the possibly negligent
defendants. Fungibility does not require chemical identity." DAVID G. OWEN et al., 2
MADDEN & OWEN ON PROD. LIAB. § 24:6 (3d ed. 2006). BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY de-
fines fungibles as "[g]oods which are identical with others of the same nature, such as
grain and oil." BAci's LAW DICTIONARY 465 (6th ed. 1990).
70. See DAVID G. OWEN et al., supra note 69, at § 24:7 n.6 (noting cases preclud-
ing application of market-share liability for asbestos-related cases because of
nonfungibility); Stevens v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 525, 540
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (noting the "diversity of asbestos products"); Celotex Corp. v.
Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533, 538-39 (Fla. 1985) (noting cases that reject market-share
theory in asbestos cases); Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 748 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. App. 1988),
affd, 772 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. 1989) (concluding that alternative theories of liability, in-
cluding market-share liability, are not available in Texas for an asbestos-related in-
jury); Starling, 533 F. Supp. 183; Vigiolto v. Johns Manville Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1454
(W.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that market-share liability is not appropriate in an action
based on an asbestos-related injury); see also Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
514 N.E.2d 691, 700 (Ohio 1987) (reasoning that market-share liability is inappropri-
ate "in an asbestos litigation case, especially where it cannot be shown that all the
products to which the injured party was exposed are completely fungible."); Marshall
v. Celotex Corp., 651 F. Supp. 389, 393 (E.D. Mich. 1987) ("asbestosis litigation is an
inappropriate area in which to extend market share liability."); Robertson v. Allied
Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 383-84 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying Pennsylvania law); White
v. Celotex Corp., 907 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying Arizona law); Blackston v.
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss1/4
LEAD PAINT LITIGATION
When market-share liability is limited to fungible products that
pose equivalent risks to users who have no reasonable means to
prove which manufacturer provided the product that cause
plaintiffs harm, it has an exceedingly limited reach .... Only
products that cause harm after a lengthy latency period be-
tween exposure and development of harm are likely to create
the systemic proof problems that market-share liability ad-
dresses. Many toxic substances, including asbestos products, do
not pose equivalent risks to all exposed to the products.7 1
Courts have recognized that many products are not fungible
because they have widely varying ranges of toxicity, depending
upon its form and use. For example, courts evaluating claims of
asbestos-related injury declined to extend "market share" liability
because while all of the asbestos products shared an important
characteristic in that they all contained asbestos fibers, they also
"have widely divergent toxicities ... caused by a combination of
factors, including: the specific type of asbestos fiber incorporated
into the product; the physical properties of the product itself; and
the percentage of asbestos used in the product."72
Courts rejected "market share" liability in the following litiga-
tion in addition to the asbestos cases mentioned above after deter-
mining that the products at issue in litigation were not fungible:
perfume litigation involving repeated exposure to
aldehydes; 73
Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., 764 F.2d 1480,(llth Cir. 1985) (applying Georgia
law). But c.f., Wheeler v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 109 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992) (recognizing that an exception might exist in asbestos-containing brake pad liti-
gation); Black v. Abex Corp., 603 N.W.2d 182, 190 (N.D. 1999) ("Although Wheeler
recognized that non-identical products may give rise to market-share liability if they
contain roughly equivalent quantities of a single type of asbestos fiber, the court did
not hold that all asbestos-containing friction brake products in all cases will be con-
sidered fungible."). ,
71. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. o
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2007).
72. Mullen v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 246 Cal. Rptr. 32, 36, (Cal. Ct. App.
1988); see also Starling, 533 F. Supp. at 191 (noting that "products containing asbes-
tos are not uniformly harmful-many products contain different degrees of asbestos.
The total risk created by any manufacturer would be a function of both its share of the
market and the relative harmfulness of its products; but a company's market share
could not be adjusted for the latter relation.") (citations omitted); Goldman, 514
N.E.2d 691 (1987) (refusing to apply Sindell to asbestos products because of the differ-
ence in risks associated with asbestos products).
73. See, e.g., Sanderson v. Int'l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981, 992
(C.D. Cal. 1996) (explaining that while all defendants' fragrance products allegedly
contain aldehydes, "each contains different types of aldehydes, with different physical
properties, at different levels of concentration").
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* tainted blood litigation;74
" lead paint litigation;75
* breast implant litigation; 76
* latex glove litigation; 77
* tire rim litigation;78
* burning pajama litigation;79
* volatile organic compound ("VOC") litigation;80
74. See, e.g., King v. Cutter Labs., 685 So. 2d 1358, 1360 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996), review dismissed, 725 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 1998) (noting that because the blood
factoring product was created from plasma donors "at various sites across the nation
... each plasma pool from which the concentrate is processed is different[,]" and that
"[elach manufacturer uses a different proprietary method to prepare its concentrate");
Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 696 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ill. 1988); but see Doe v.
Cutter Biological, Inc., 971 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1992); Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc.,
823 P.2d 717.
75. See, e.g., City of St. Louis, 226 S.W.2d 110, 115-16 (Mo. 2007) ("Without prod-
uct identification, the city can do no more than show that the defendants' lead paint
may have been present in the properties where the city claims to have incurred abate-
ment costs. That risks exposing these defendants to liability greater than their re-
sponsibility and may allow the actual wrongdoer to escape liability entirely ...
Absent product identification evidence, the City simply cannot prove actual causa-
tion."); Jackson v. Glidden Co., No. 87779, 2007 WL 184662, IT 12, 15 (Ohio Ct. App.
Jan. 25, 2007), pet. denied, (Ohio, June 20, 2007) (acknowledging that "[iun Ohio mar-
ket-share liability is not an available theory of recovery in a lead-paint based products
liability action.") (citations omitted); Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 690 A.2d
169, 172 (Pa. 1997); Brenner v. American Cyanamid Co., 699 N.Y.S.2d 848, 853 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1999) (among the reasons cited for rejecting market-share theory in a lead
paint poisoning case were the fact that lead pigments other than white lead carbonate
are used in lead-based paint; white lead carbonate is used for products other than
interior residential paint; lead pigments are found in products other than lead-based
paint; and lead-based paint is not fumgible.); Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Company,
3 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1993) (declining to extend market-share liability under Massachu-
setts law because the plaintiff could not date when the lead paint was applied with
any degree of precision; thus making the determination of the appropriate market
speculative at best).
76. See Matter of New York State Silicone Breast Implant Litigation, 166 Misc.
2d 85, 89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), order affd, 234 A.D.2d 28(1st Dep't 1996) (not applica-
ble "to breast implants because such products are not fungible and the manufacturers
of the implants can often be identified").
77. See Kennedy v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 736 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996).
78. See Cummins v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 495 A.2d 963 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1985) (rejecting theory in action against manufacturers of multipiece tire and rim
assemblies because products are not sufficiently similar to be considered identical or
fungible).
79. See Bixler v. Avondale Mills, 405 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting
theory because cotton flannelette is not a fungible product).
80. See Setliff v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 769-70
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting market-share liability against manufacturers of paints,
solvents, strippers, glue products because VOC is a generic description for a class of
chemicals found in many products including antiperspirants and deodorants and
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss1/4
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* handgun injuries;81 and
" exploding car batteries.8 2
lV. LEAD PAINT LITIGATION AND "MARKET
SHARE" LIABILITY
One area of litigation where plaintiffs continue to pursue the
use of "market share" liability has been in the lead paint litiga-
tion. Lead paint cases are typically brought by persons who lived
in older homes once painted with lead-based paint who have or
had elevated levels of lead in their blood. They may also be pur-
sued by governmental or quasi-governmental entities looking for
persons to pay for the cost of removing lead paint from buildings
(e.g., school districts and housing authorities). Sometimes they are
filed by parents, activists and lawyers seeking relief on behalf of
children who suffered from lead poisoning, who had elevated
levels of lead in their blood, or who are merely in danger of being
exposed to high concentrations of lead because they live in older
homes.8 3
In lead paint litigation, plaintiffs often sue their landlords or
owners of the homes who are responsible for the upkeep and main-
tenance of their properties.8 4 In these types of claims, the plain-
"[wIithout an allegation of a fungible product, plaintiff cannot state a cause of action
under the market share theory of liability").
81. See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1067 (N.Y. 2001) (re-
fusing to apply market-share liability because "guns are not identical, fungible prod-
ucts" and gun manufacturers' marketing techniques are not uniform; therefore, a
"manufacturer's share of the national handgun market does not necessarily corre-
spond to the amount of risk created by its alleged tortious conduct").
82. See York v. Lunkes, 545 N.E.2d 478, 480 (1989) (declining to apply market-
share liability because "batteries made by different manufacturers are readily distin-
guishable from one another" and because unlike the drug DES, all batteries are not
"defective").
83. For a thorough overview of the use of lead historically, its toxicity, its use in
paint, federal regulations aimed at controlling and eliminating the risk of lead paint
poisoning and a summary of lead paint litigation see generally Richard Faulk & John
Gray, Getting the Lead Out? The Misuse of Public Nuisance Litigation By Public Au-
thorities and Private Counsel, 21 Toxics L. Rep. (pts. 1-3) 1071, 1071-98, 1124-52,
1172-96 (2006) (three-part series), for a thorough overview of the use of lead histori-
cally, its toxicity, its use in paint, federal regulations aimed at controlling and elimi-
nating the risk of lead paint poisoning and a summary of lead paint litigation.
84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 358, case citations July 1991 to June
1998, case citations July 1998 to June 2006 (1965) (collecting cases); RESTATEMENT OF
LAw 2D, PROPERTY, §17.6 ("A landlord should be subject to liability for physical harm
caused to the tenant and others upon the leased property with the consent of the
tenant or his subtenants by a dangerous condition existing before or arising after the
tenant has taken possession, if he has failed to exercise reasonable care to repair the
condition and the existence of the condition is in violation of: (1) an implied warranty
23
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tiffs allege that the landlord negligently failed to properly
maintain the home or failed to provide the warnings required by
the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 199285
as amended on March 6, 1996. Through this Act, the EPA and
HUD jointly established regulations requiring sellers, lessors and
brokers to provide purchasers and tenants with pre-sale/lease in-
formation about lead-based paint hazards in targeted homes, con-
dos or apartments.8 6 The Act's primary focus is on disclosure of
known hazards.
In addition to landlords, plaintiffs look to the historical manu-
facturers of lead pigment and paint. However, plaintiffs are gener-
ally unable to identify with any specificity the manufacturer of the
lead paint that they claim caused their injuries.8 7 Therefore, they
often cast a wide net by suing all known paint and pigment manu-
facturers claiming that they marketed most of the lead pigments
used in the paints that were sold in the U.S. during the early parts
of the Twentieth Century until 1978, when lead paint pigment
of habitability; or (2) a duty created by statute or administrative regulation."); see also
Young v. Garwacki, 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1049 (Mass. 1980); Thompson v. Crownover,
381 S.E.2d 283, 284-85 (Ga. 1989); Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409 (Wis. 1961).
85. Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672 (1992). This Act is Title X of the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 4851 and is often referred to as
"Title X." See also Barbara B. Altera, Lead-Based Paint Activities in Military Family
Housing, 54 A.F. L. REV. 101, 105 (2004). "Various provisions of Title X were incorpo-
rated into the LPPPA and [the Toxic Substances Control Act] ("TSCA")." See 15
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (subchapter IV-Lead Exposure Reduction) (2007). "Those re-
maining provisions are codified in Title 42 of the United States Code, Chapter 63A."
Altera, supra note 85, at 105.
86. Lead; Requirements for disclosure of Known Lead-based Paint and/or Lead-
Based Paint Hazards in Housing, 61 FED. REG. 9064 (March 6, 1996) (codified at 40
C.F.R. Pt.745, subpt. F & 24 C.F.R. Pt. 35, subpt. H, respectively). "Congress required
the EPA... to publish and periodically revise a lead hazard information pamphlet. In
addition, the EPA was required to implement regulations requiring paid renovators to
provide a lead hazard information pamphlet to owners/occupants of housing to be
renovated." Altera, supra note 85, at 107 (citing Pub. L. No. 102-550 § 1021(a), 106
Stat. 3672, 3920 (1992) (adding TSCA § 406(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2686(a)) and adding TSCA
§ 406(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2686(b)). See also Faulk and Gray, supra note 83, at 1139-40.
87. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Lead Industries Association, Inc., 106 F.3d 1245, 1250
(5th Cir. 1997); see also Santiago, 3 F.3d at 547 (1st Cir. 1993) ("plaintiff could not
identify which, if any, of the defendants were the source of the lead she ingested or
when the alleged injury-causing paint may have been applied to the walls and wood-
work of her childhood home."); Lewis v. Lead Industries Ass'n, Inc., 793 N.E.2d 869
(Ill. 2003) (holding that "[b]y failing to identify the defendant that supplied the lead
pigment used in the paint to which their children were exposed, the plaintiffs failed to
satisfy the causation element of a claim ... for lead poisoning."); Chicago v. American
Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 134 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (noting that plaintiff is unable
to identify any specific defendant as the source of the lead pigment or paint at any
particular location).
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was outlawed for residential purposes. But with just a few excep-
tions, products liability law requires plaintiffs to identify the man-
ufacturer of the allegedly defective product they claim caused
their injury in order to prove proximate causation. Consequently,
when plaintiffs were unable to make this showing, their cases
were dismissed on summary judgment grounds or later at trial.88
A. With one Exception, Courts Have Held that "Market
Share" Liability is Not Appropriate in Lead Paint
Litigation
To get around this identification problem, plaintiffs ask
courts to apply "market share" liability to their cases. They want
the court to presume the product of each and every defendant that
historically manufactured lead paint pigment caused their injury
unless the defendant can prove otherwise. Every court, except one,
that has addressed this issue has rejected the use of "market
share" liability in lead paint cases. As discussed above, most
states have generally rejected the use of "market share" liability
for any product for policy reasons.8 9 Other courts have specifically
addressed the applicability of "market share" liability in lead
paint cases and rejected its use. This section briefly addresses the
reasons courts have rejected the use of "market share" liability in
lead paint cases.
1. Lead Paint is Not a Fungible Product
Perhaps the most fundamental reason that lead paint litiga-
tion does not lend itself to "market share" liability is that lead-
based paint was not a generic uniform product. All DES used for
88. See, e.g., Jefferson, 106 F.3d at 1252-53 (noting that plaintiffs obligation to
identify the manufacturer of the allegedly defective product is inherent in the Louisi-
ana Products Liability Act requirements); Chicago v. American Cyanamid Co., 823
N.E.2d at 139 (dismissing case because, among other reasons, the plaintiffs were un-
able to make requisite factual allegations of proximate causation); see also Cofield v.
Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. MJG-99-3277, 2000 WL 34292681 (D. Md. Aug. 17, 2000); Phil-
adelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112, 114, 121-22 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that
the city's claims for negligence and strict liability were time barred because they ac-
crued in 1976 when Congress enacted federal law regarding lead abatement in feder-
ally funded public housing, and the complaint was filed 14 years later); Hymowitz v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (N.Y. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989)
(explaining that "[iun a products liability action, identification of the exact defendant
whose product injured the plaintiff is, of course, generally required"); Santiago, 3 F.3d
at 550-52 (holding that under Massachusetts law, plaintiff could not recover under
either market-share theory of liability or concert in action theory).
89. See supra section III.A.
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the treatment of pregnant women was manufactured according to
an identical formula and presented an identical risk of harm.90 In
contrast, lead paint had different chemical formulations, con-
tained different amounts of lead, and differed in potential toxic-
ity.91 Some lead-based paint contained 10% lead pigment while
some contained 50% lead pigment. In addition to the varying
amount of lead pigment, the type of lead pigment used also va-
ried.9 2 Thus, the equivalent risk of harm that formed the basis for
"market share" liability in the DES setting is absent.
a. History of Paint Manufacturing
People have been using lead-based paint since before the Ro-
man Empire.93 By the 12th century, paint making involved the
painters mixing dry pigments with oils such as linseed oil. "Ad-
vancements in the production of paint came about in the early
1700s when paint mills in England and America were making
finely powdered pigments ground with a granite ball. Painters
would blend pigments with a solvent on their own."94 Thus, each
painter created his own unique brand of paint. It was not until the
mid-to-late 1860s that paint manufacturers began making pre-
mixed paints for customers.9 5 "By the mid-1880s, mechanization
was making the manufacturing process accessible to a larger and
less specialized group of entrepreneurs."96 More importantly, the
weight of prepared paint makes it expensive to transport, so a de-
centralized structure of small paint factories began springing up
across the nation. These small independent paint mills dominated
the industry until the mid-1900s.9 7
90. Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980).
91. Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 690 A.2d 169, 173 (Pa. 1997).
92. Brenner v. American Cyanamid Co., 699 N.Y.S.2d 848, 853 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999).
93. "[Red lead was discovered by accident in about 2500 BC. White lead occurred
naturally but demand encouraged production of manmade versions. Vitruvius de-
scribes production of white lead in the 2nd century AD." The History of Paint, http:l!
www.brendasemanick.com/art.historyofpaint.htm (last visited June 25, 2007).
94. Ester Brody, The Painting Trade, 2 PAINTPRO (2000), available at http:!!
www.paintpro.net/Abstracts/PP202-England.cfm (last visited June 24, 2007). Na-
tional Paint & Coatings Ass'n, News & Information: History of Paints and Coatings
(2006) ("The first recorded paint mill in America was reportedly established in Boston
in 1700 by Thomas Child."), http://www.paint.org/ind-info/history.cfm (last visited
June 25, 2007).
95. Brody, supra note 94.
96. National Paint & Coatings Ass'n, supra note 94.
97. Id.
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b. Many Formulas Were Used to Make Paint
Until the late 1800s and early 1900s, most painters mixed
their own paint to meet their own unique and diverse needs. 98
This diversity in paint formulations is driven by the need for a
range of colors, the wide range of surfaces to which paint is ap-
plied, a diversity of paint uses and differing exposure (weathering)
conditions. There are many paint properties such as covering or
obscuring power, drying time, paint-film-hardness, film flexibility,
color permanence, water resistance, UV resistance, ease of appli-
cation, control of paint layer thickness, rate of chalking, mold and
fire resistance, among others, that are able to be modified by vary-
ing the properties and proportions of major components and minor
additives. 99 The commercial pressures to differentiate products in
the marketplace, and the many possible ways to prepare paints
resulted in a wide variety of accessory compounds in pigment
materials. Likewise, variations in the origin and amount of
processing of minerals and chemical raw materials also had a
strong influence on accessory compounds in a bulk pigment prod-
uct as well as an influence on trace elements in bulk pigment sam-
ples and trace elements within pigment particles.
Of all the lead-based paints, white lead was once clearly the
foundation of the paint industry. A 1944 book about mixing paint
contained a listing of 246 paint color recipes or formulae, 135 of
which included white lead as an ingredient, and an additional 38
that did not contain white lead but did list other lead pigments
such as lead chromates. 100 Thus, even when white lead
predominated as an ingredient, a substantial portion of the lead
paint marketed and used by customers did not contain it. This fact
alone illustrates the uniqueness and variability of lead paint.
98. Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 570 (Wis. 2005) (noting
that "painters in the early decades of the 1900s often had their own individual formu-
las or methods for mixing the paint that they thought was best, depending on what a
specific job required"). With respect to inorganic pigments: black lead sulfate was first
introduced between 1855 and 1866; chrome green was first used in 1825; chrome or-
ange, red and yellow were discovered in 1809; lead sulfate (white lead) goes back to at
least Roman times; mineral yellow was patented in 1871; and red lead also dates back
to Roman times. MiKE VAN ALPHEN, Australian Dep't of Human Servs., PAINT FILM
COMPONENTS: NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH MONOGRAPHS, NATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL HEALTH FORUM MONOGRAPHS, GENERAL SERIES No. 2 (1998) [hereinafter
PAINT MONOGRAPH] (citations omitted).
99. PAINT MONOGRAPH, supra note 98, at 9. See also Faulk and Gray, supra note
83, at 1142-44 (a primer on paint).
100. PAINT MONOGRAPH, supra note 98, at 27 (citing F.N. Vanderwalker, THE Mix-
ING OF COLORS AND PAINTs (Frederick J. Drake & Co. 1944)).
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When a New York court was asked to apply "market share"
liability to a lead paint case, the court concluded that although in
New York "market share" liability is applicable in DES cases, it is
not appropriate in lead paint cases. 10 1 In making its decision, the
New York court compared the factors present in a lead paint case
to those present in a DES case. On the issue of fungibility, the
court noted the following:
Arguably, the white lead carbonate used as a raw material in
some lead-based paint did not differ between manufacturers.
However, paint manufacturers used differing amounts of white
lead carbonate, or some other lead pigment, in their paints.
Some lead-based paint contained 10% lead pigment, while other
paint was more toxic, containing as much as 50% lead pigment.
Not only did the amount of lead pigment vary, but so did the
type of lead pigment used. Thus, unlike DES, the finished prod-
uct that was used by consumers here, i.e., lead-based paint, was
not fungible. 10 2
Furthermore, lead compounds other than white lead carbon-
ate are often found in interior residential paint. Residential paint
can include leaded zinc oxide, lead chromate, lead silicate, and
lead sulfate.10 3 In one case, plaintiffs' own expert agreed that
white lead carbonate accounted for only approximately 80% of the
lead in all lead pigments used for interior paints between 1926
and 1955. In that case, the plaintiff had not sued the manufactur-
ers of the remaining 20% of the lead pigments found in those inte-
rior paints.10 4
101. Brenner v. American Cyanamid Co., 699 N.Y.S.2d 848, 853 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999).
102. Id. See also Jackson v. Glidden Co., No. 87779, 2007 WL 184662, 24 (Ohio
Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2007), pet. denied, (Ohio, June 20, 2007) (noting that "paint manu-
facturers used their own formulas for incorporating white lead into paint" and that
there were a "variety of lead pigments other than white lead carbonate that were used
in paint formulations"). Before 1955, the paint contained anywhere from less than 2%
to more than 70% lead by weight. See Gifford, supra note 26, at 153 n.290 (comparing
Am. Standard Ass'n, Am. Standard Specifications to Minimize Hazards to Children
from Residual Surface Coating Materials 5, § 2(a) (1955) (indicating that the volun-
tary standard adopted by industry in 1955 limited lead in paint to no more than 1% of
total weight) with Bureau of Standards, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, United States Gov-
ernment Master Specification for Paint, White, and Tinted Paints Made on a White
Base, Semipaste, and Ready Mixed (Standard Specification No. 10b), in Circular of
Bureau of Standards, No. 89, at 2 (3d ed. 1927) (requiring that paint purchased by the
federal government include between 45% and 70% white lead.)). Thus, one paint can
pose a risk 35 times as great as another paint. Gifford, supra note 26, at 153.
103. Brenner, 699 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
104. Id. at 852.
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c. Differing Paint Formulas Means Differing
Levels of Bioavailability
Differing formulas of lead paint result in differing levels of
bioavailability of the lead. "The term 'bioavailability' refers to 'the
extent to which the lead is in a form which is easily internalized
by the body, i.e., the extent to which it is in a form which can be
physiologically transported through the lungs, gastrointestinal
tract, skin, etc. and absorbed into the bloodstream ... ,"'1o5 Put-
ting this concept into the context of lead paint litigation one court
stated:
Because of differences in bioavailability, a child who ingests
dust or chips of lead paint containing equal amounts of lead "de-
rived from two lead paints will not generally develop equal ele-
vation in internal lead level from the two paints. Rather, more
highly bioavailable lead has a greater impact than lead in less
bioavailable form." Thus, differing formulae of lead paint has a
direct bearing on how much damage a lead paint manufac-
turer's product would cause.10 6
The fact that differing paint formulas create different degrees
of risk of harm was found to be "fatal" to plaintiffs claim that
"market share" liability should be applied to their lead paint case.
The court noted that "market share liability is grounded on the
premise that it ensures that 'each manufacturer's liability would
approximate its responsibility for the injuries caused by its own
products." 10 7 It reasoned that in lead paint cases, apportioning
liability on a manufacturer's market share would not approximate
that manufacturer's responsibility for injuries caused by its lead
paint. l 08
2. Childhood Lead Poisoning is Not Caused by a
Signature Injury
Another factor present in the DES context is the presence of a
signature injury directly linked to the drug DES. 10 9 In lead paint
litigation, the harm or injury complained about is frequently
termed "childhood lead poisoning." As can be seen below, however,
105. Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 690 A.2d 169, 173 n.5 (Pa. 1997) (quot-
ing the Record on Review).
106. Id. at 173 (internal citations omitted).
107. Id. (quoting Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937).
108. Id.
109. See supra note 27.
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there is no "signature injury"-similar to those associated with
DES-that necessarily links "childhood lead poisoning" solely to
lead-based paint. 110
"Childhood lead poisoning" is a term frequently used to de-
scribe children found to have elevated levels of lead in their blood.
The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (the "CDC") has
set its blood lead level of concern at 10 pg/dL.111 Based on this
level of concern, any child with an elevated blood lead level (in
excess of 10 [Lg/dL) is often deemed by governmental agencies to
be lead poisoned.1 12 However, "childhood lead poisoning" is not
110. Jackson v. Glidden Co., No. 87779, 2007 WL 184662, IT 24 (Ohio Ct. App.
Jan. 25, 2007) ("there is no single, defined injury that results from lead poisoning");
see also Brenner v. American Cyanamid Co., 699 N.Y.S.2d 848, 853 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999); Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Company, 782 F. Supp. 186, 192-93 (D. Mass.
1992) (noting the absence of a unique injury in lead cases); Starling v. Seaboard Coast
Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183, 190-91 (S.D.Ga. 1982) (noting that asbestos is not caused
by a signature injury because the asbestos-related injuries "are not restricted to as-
bestos products-other products, such as cigarettes, may have caused or contributed to
the injury."); Case v. Fibreboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Okla. 1987). See also
Faulk and Gray, supra note 83, at 1093-96 (discussing exposure pathways for lead).
111. Comm'n on Life Scis, Measuring Lead Exposure In Infants, Children, and
Other Sensitive Populations, . 28 (1993). The CDC has proclaimed that "it is not possi-
ble to select a single number to define lead poisoning for the various purposes of all of
these groups." Ctr. For Disease Control, Preventing Lead Poisoning in Young Chil-
dren (1991), available at http//www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/publications/books/plpyc/chap-
terl.htm. It acknowledged that epidemiologic studies have identified harmful effects
of lead in children at blood lead levels ("BLLs") at least as low as 10 ig/dL and recog-
nized that some studies have suggested harmful effects at even lower levels, but the
body of information accumulated so far is not adequate for effects below about 10 Rg/
dL to be evaluated definitively. It further recognized that no threshold has been iden-
tified for the harmful effects of lead. Id. Clinical symptoms of lead poisoning appear at
blood lead levels of 80 gg/dL or greater, and symptomatic lead poisoning may appear
at BLLs of 50-60 gg/dL, particularly in the presence of anemia, although in some
individuals "symptoms may be so mild that they are overlooked." U.S. Dep't of Health,
Education and Welfare, Ctr, for Disease Control, Nat'l Inst. For Occupataional Safeth
& Health, NIOSH Alert No. 91-116a, Preventing Lead Poisoning in Construction
Workers (April 1992), available at http:lcdc.gov/niosh/91-116.html.
112. Today, most government agencies refer to any child with a BLL above 10 Rg/
dL as having lead poisoning. While perhaps technically accurate (i.e., poisoning is the
act of taking in any substance that is injurious to health or dangerous to life), this
loose use of the term "lead poisoning" ignores the specific level of harm at issue.
Clinical symptoms of lead poisoning appear at BLLs of 70-100 gg/dL or greater and
symptomatic lead poisoning may appear at BLLs of 35-40 gg/dL. AGENCY FOR Toxic
SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY ("ASTDR"), DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.,
CASE STUDIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL MEDICINE-LEAD ToxicITY, EXPOSURE PATHWAY,
(Course: SS3059) (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/HEC/CSEM/lead/
exposure-pathways.html#paint. Thus, a child with a BLL of 10 gg/dL is not suffering
from either chronic or acute blood poisoning. Obviously, at 10 gg/dL, government
agencies are not concerned with classical examples of lead poisoning. Instead, they
are concerned with subclinical manifestations associated with exposure to lead. Spe-
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caused solely by exposure to lead-based paint. Instead, it can be
caused by any exposure to lead. Thus, a plaintiffs injuries may be
caused by some source other than lead-based paint. 113
Typically, plaintiffs in lead paint litigation try to causally con-
nect low level exposures (as compared to high level exposures) of
lead to adverse neurological effects (i.e., lower IQs and behavior
problems) in very young children. 1 4 Significantly, the children in-
volved are usually not in high school or even middle school, where
academic performance can be measured to some degree. Instead,
the plaintiffs usually focus on the IQ of preschoolers-sometimes
children as young as two years old." l5 To show injury in such per-
sons, plaintiffs must show that lead-and only lead-is responsi-
ble for an observed "effect" on a child's IQ or behavior. Overall,
this is extremely difficult because these researchers have great
difficulty demonstrating that a low level exposure to only one sub-
cifically, the government agencies are concerned about the possibility that low level
exposure to lead may affect a child's IQ. See, e.g., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, PUB. HEALTH SERV., GENERAL LEAD INFOR-
MATION: QUESTIONS AND ANswERs,(2006), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/
faq/about.htm ("Lead poisoning can cause learning disabilities, behavioral problems,
and, at very high levels, seizures, coma, and even death.").
113. See Brenner, 699 N.Y.S.2d at 853; Santiago, 782 F. Supp. at 192 (noting that
"heredity, social and environmental factors, or lead in other products, could have
caused, or could have contributed to, Santiago's injuries.").
114. Bruce P. Lanphear, et al., Low-Level Environmental Lead Exposure And Chil-
dren's Intellectual Function: An International Pooled Analysis, 113 ENVT'L HEALTH
PERSPECTIVES 894 (2005); Safety Drinking Water in the District of Columbia: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Env't and Hazardous Materials of the H. Energry and
Commerce Comm., 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Bruce P. Lanphear, M.D., the
Sloan Professor) ("Experimental studies, both in rodents and non-human primates,
have since documented lead related deficits at low-level exposures and established
these to be direct effects of lead.") (emphasis added) [hereinafter "Lanphear testi-
mony"]. To support the causal association between lead and IQ, Dr. Lanphear citied
his own studies as proof of a "lead-associated reading deficit" in children with BLLs
below 5 gg/dL (citing to Bruce P. Lanphear et al., Cognitive Deficits Associated With
Blood Lead Levels < 10 Mg/Dl In U.S. Children And Adolescents, 115 PUB. HEALTH
REP. 521 (2000)) and as proving that an increase in a lifetime mean BLL from less
than 1 to 10 gg/dL was "associated" with a 7.4 point IQ deficit (citing R.I Canfield, et
al., Intellectual Impairment In Children With Blood Lead Concentrations Below 10
Micrograms Per Deciliter, 348 N ENG. J MED. 1517 (2003)).
115. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., NATL CTR. FOR
ENVT'L ASSESMENT, EPA/600/R-05/144aF, AIR QUALITY CRITERIA FOR LEAD, VOL 1, 6-
72 (2006) [hereinafter "CRITERIA DOCUMENT"] (Testing of infants is especially difficult
because they "are in a period of rapid developmental change. Also, the way an infant's
cognitive functions can be probed is restricted. The lack of continuity between their
response modalities and ones that can be exploited as a child gets older is also a fac-
tor.") and 6-71 ("acknowledging that the sensitivity of these tests to toxicity has been
in question."), available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/cfm/recordisplay.cfm?deid=
158823 (last visited June 25, 2007) (links to PDF downloads).
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stance "directly effects" the brain's intelligence and a person's be-
havior. The problem is compounded (1) because scientists truly do
not have an understanding of how the brain works or why some
people are "more intelligent" and others are "less intelligent," and
(2) because many variables acting independently or in conjunction
with other variables can affect the way the brain functions or how
a person behaves. These issues raise the age-old "nature or nur-
ture" question (i.e., the extent a person's genetics [nature] versus
the environment in which they are raised [nurture] have in ex-
plaining individual differences in intelligence). 1 16
a. Children are Exposed to Many Different
Sources of Lead
Beyond the inability of science to establish a "signature in-
jury," it is equally impossible to ascribe all instances of "childhood
lead poisoning" to lead paint, as opposed to some other source of
lead.117 Exposure to lead occurs through every conceivable path-
way. Children may be exposed to lead when they eat foodll8 or
candy"19 contaminated with lead. Many children are exposed to
lead when they drink the water in their homes 20 or at their
116. See generally, Nature vs. Nuture in Intelligence, http://www. wilderdom.com/
personality/L4-llntelligenceNatureVsNurture.html (last visited June 25, 2007) (dis-
cussion on nature versus nurture).
117. See Faulk and Gray, supra note 83, at 1080-84, 1142-50 (discussing alterna-
tive source of lead exposure).
118. Smog and haze accounts for "an estimated 40% of lead in food, while the bulk
of the remainder [comes] from contaminations during harvesting, transporting,
processing, packaging or preparing the food." CRITERIA DOCUMENT, supra note 115, at
3-48 (citation omitted). Lead in meat and poultry is a result of lead emissions that
settle onto forage, feed or onto soil that is directly ingested by animals. Id.
119. Several brands of candy manufactured in Mexico have been found to be
wrapped in wrappers containing lead or bearing lead-containing ink. Letter from Alan
H. Schoem, Dir., Office of Compliance, Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n to U.S. Candy
Importers (July 9, 2004), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/BUSINFO/cndyus.pdf; Let-
ter from Alan H. Schoem, Dir., Office of Compliance, Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n
to Candy Producers in Mexico (July 12, 2004), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/
BUSINFO/cndymex.pdf. The FDA has determined that some ingredients (chili pow-
der and tamarind) used in candy products imported into the U.S. and marketed to the
U.S. Hispanic population contain high levels of lead. Letter from Janice F. Oliver,
Deputy Dir., Ctr. for Food Safety & Applied Nutrition, FDA to Manufacturers, Im-
porters, and Distributors of Imported Candy (Mar. 25, 2004), available at http:l/
www.cfsan.fda.gov/%7Edms/pbltr.html.
120. Lead in drinking water contributes between 10 and 20% of the total lead expo-
sure in young children. Ctr. for Disease Control and Preventions, U.S. Dept. of Health
& Human Servs., Fact Sheet: Lead and Drinking Water from Private Wells (2003),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dpd/healthywater/factsheets/pdf/lead.pdf; see
also Criteria Document, supra note 115, at 3-33; Richard P. Maas, et al., Reducing
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schools. 121 Exposure to lead may occur from ingesting soils con-
taining lead from lead arsenate pesticides and even lead weights
used to balance tires. 122 Young children are exposed to lead on
baby cribs and their accessories, 123 on toys, 124 costume jewelry, 125
Lead Exposure from Drinking Water: Recent History and Current Status, 120 Pub.
Health Rep. 316, 318 (2005), available at http://www.publichealthreports.org
userfiles/120_3/120316.pdf (citation omitted).
121. The holding tanks on many older water fountains are made of lead. Lead tests
in some "[p]ublic [s]chools show that more than 80% of its schools have serious lead
contamination in one or more drinking fountains. In some schools, virtually every
drinking fountain in the school was above the EPA limit of 20 ppb." Mark S. Cooper,
Editorial, Get The Lead Out Of Schools' Water, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 2,
2004. At B7. For example, one Seattle school had a drinking fountain with a lead level
of 1,600 ppb. Id.
122. Jack Caravanos et al., An Exterior and Interior Leaded Dust Deposition Sur-
vey in New York City: Results of a 2-Year Study, 100 ENVTL. RESEARCH 159-64 (2006).
CRITERIA DOCUMENT, supra note 115, at 3-16 to -17. Lead concentrations decrease
both with depth and distance from roadways. Id. at 3-19. In many studies the age of
housing was not a major factor, suggesting that the impacts of lead-based paint may
be dominated by historic emissions of leaded gasoline additives. Id. at 3-20.
123. Children's jewelry is not the only product being sold for use by children that
contain lead-based paint. As a result of testing, the CPSC has found that some baby
cribs and accessories being sold in the U.S. contain hazardous levels of lead paint. See
Press Release, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, Danara Baby Crib Exercisers
Recalled Because of Lead Hazard, Release No. 85-063 (Dec. 5, 1985), available at
http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpubl/prerel/prhtml85/85063.html; see also, Press Release,
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, Musical Crib Mobile Recalled, Release No.
87-033 (June. 4, 1987), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpubl/prerel/prhtml87/
87033.html; Press Release, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, The Little Tikes
Company Recalls Little Tikes Crib Center Due To Lead Paint Hazard, Release No. 92-
094 (June 16, 1992), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpubl/prerel/prhtml92/
92094.html; Press Release, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, CPSC, Delta En-
terprise Corp. Announce Recall of Certain Cribs Sold at Toys R Us Stores, New Re-
lease No. 06-036 (Nov. 22, 2005), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpubllprerell
prhtm106/06036.
124. Children are continually being given toys that are considered lead hazards.
For example, it has been discovered that toys given to children by libraries across the
nation as reading prizes this summer had unacceptable levels of lead. The toys were
distributed by the Collaborative Summer Library Program, whose members include
about 1,000 libraries in 36 states. Michael P. Mckinney, Library Prizes Pose Lead
Hazard to Children, PROVIDENCE J., Sep. 3, 2006, at B-05; Jeri Krentz, After Test
Finds Lead in Toys, Libraries Taking Back Prizes; Flexible Dogs And Cats Exceed
Level Of Lead Allowed By Federal Rules, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 10, 2006, at 1B;
see also, Courtney Bacalso, Toy Risk Feared, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER (CALIFORNIA),
Aug. 9, 2006.
125. Recalls of children's jewelry that contain high concentrations of lead are seem-
ingly becoming a common occurrence these days. And these are just the products we
know about. In the last couple of years over a hundred million pieces of cheap and free
children's jewelry have been recalled because of high lead concentrations. Press Re-
lease, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, Metal Charms Sold with Twentieth
Century Fox DVDs Recalled for Toxic Lead Hazard, Release No. 06-156 (May 5, 2006),
available at http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpubl/prerel/prhtm106/06156.html. See also,
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and even through sidewalk chalk or crayons. 126 A child may be
exposed to lead through the tableware 127 holding their food or the
glassware1 28 from which they drink. Children can be exposed to
lead counter weights in a home's grandfather clock or the lead bal-
Press Release, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, Dollar Tree Stores Inc. Toy
Jewelry Recalled for Lead Poisoning Hazard to Children, Release No. 06-118 (Mar.
23, 2006), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpublprerel/prhtml06/06118.html;
Press Release, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, Juicy Couture Children's Jew-
elry Recalled for Lead Poisoning Hazard, Release No. 05-160 (Aug. 25, 2006), availa-
ble at http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpubl/prerel/prhtml06/06160; Press Release, U.S.
Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, Chlidren's Jewelry Sold at American Girl Stores
Recalled for Lead Poisoning Hazard Release No. 06-123 (Mar. 30, 2006), available at
http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpubl/prerel/prhtml06/06123.html; Press Release, U.S. Con-
sumer Product Safety Comm'n, CPSC Announces Recall of Metal Toy Jewelry Sold in
Vending Machines; Firms Agree to Stop Importation Until Hazard is Eliminated, Re-
lease No. 04-174 (July 8, 2004), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpubl/prerel/
prhtm04/04174.html; Assoc. Press, Lead Poisoning Threat Forces Kids Jewelry Re-
call, (Mar. 23. 2006).
126. See Press Release, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, CPSC And Con-
cord Enterprises Announce Recall of Certain Crayons Because of Lead Poisoning Haz-
ard, Release No. 94-049 (Mar. 22, 1994), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpubll
prerel/prhtml94/94049.html (recalling crayons made in China). Some of these crayons
contained enough lead to present a lead poisoning hazard to young children who ate
or chewed on the crayons. Id. In 2004, Target and Toys "R" Us had to recall sidewalk
chalk they sold because it contained high levels of lead. Press Release, U.S. Consumer
Product Safety Comm'n, CPSC, Target Corporation Announce Recall of Multicolored
Sidewalk Chalk, Release No. 04-032 (Nov. 13, 2003), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/
cpscpub1prerel/prhtml04/04032.html; Press Release, U.S. Consumer Product Safety
Comm'n, CPSC, Toys "R" Us, Inc. Announce Recall of Solid-colored and Multi-colored
Sidewalk Chalk, Release No. 04-038 (Nov. 24, 2003), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/
cpscpubl/prerellprhtm104/04038.html.
127. Lead is used as a coloring element in ceramic glazes used in common table-
ware, notably in the colors red and yellow. Michael McCann, Lead Glazes in the Amer-
icas, 18 ART HAZARDs NEWS 3 (1995) ("The problem of lead poisoning from glazed
pottery imported from Mexico and other developing countries is well known ....
[Clases of severe lead poisoning are due to very high levels of lead in the glazes (as
much as 75-85%) and poor firing conditions that result in glazes that leach a lot of
lead."); see also CERAMIcs TODAY Lead: A Once Common Glaze Ingredient, http://
www.ceramicstoday.com/articles/lead.htm (last visited June 12, 2007) ("Any acidic
foods or liquids subsequently used with such glazes, e.g., fruit juices, will dissolve
unbound lead particles from the glaze surface. In extreme cases this could create a
lethal dos[e] of lead.").
128. "Lead may leach from lead crystal decanters and glasses into the liquids they
contain." Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry, U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Servs., Draft Toxicological Profile for Lead 316 (2005). For example, after 4
months in three decanters (containing 32%, 32%, and 24% lead oxide), the lead con-
centration in Port wine increased from 89 gg/L to 5,331 gg/L, 3,061 gg/L and 2,162 jig/
L, respectively. Id. Of more concern, lead was also found to leach from lead crystal
wine glasses within minutes. Mean lead concentrations in wine contained in 12
glasses rose from 33 gg/L initially to 68 pg/L, 81 g g/L, 92 jig/L and 99 gg/L after 1, 2, 3
and 4 hours, respectively. Id.
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last in a sailboat. 129 They can be exposed by an older sibling's or
parent's cosmetics, 130 hobby materials, folk remedies, 13 1 or can-
dles.132 There are countless sources of lead to which a young child
may be exposed. The following diagram represents an attempt by
the National Academy of Sciences to map the multiple environ-
mental pathways that result in human exposure to lead. 133
As can be seen, blaming a single product for "childhood lead
poisoning" is impossible without ruling out the presence of alter-
native and confounding causes in the child's environment-and
without such an exercise, there is no way to show that any cause
is either present or "substantially" responsible for the child's con-
dition. Although it may be potentially lucrative to isolate an "in-
dustry" with assets supposedly sufficient to address "childhood
lead poisoning," and although it may be convenient to focus all at-
tention on that "industry" by ignoring the universe of alternative
causes for elevated levels of lead in the blood, such fictions have
nothing to do with science or reality. In fact, the use of "market
share" liability in these cases turns the problem on its head by
129. Lead is used for the ballast keel of sailboats and as counterweights for grand-
father clocks and elevators. See generally American Tin & Solder, Lead Ballast, http:ll
www.american-tinandsolder.com/lead-ballast.htm (last visited June 24, 2007) (click
on links at left for more information).
130. Lead is used in some non-Western cosmetics, such as surma and kohl and
some types of hair colorants, cosmetics and dyes contain lead acetate. AGENCY FOR
Toxic SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVS.,
DRAFT TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR LEAD 6 (2005) (Public Health Statement for Lead).
131. Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry, U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Servs., Draft Toxicological Profile for Lead 315 (2005) (discussing non-West-
ern folk remedies such as: "Alarcon, Ghasard, Alkohl, Greta, Azarcon, Liga, Bali Goli,
Pay-loo-ah, Coral and Rueda"). See also Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention,
Adult Lead Poisoning from an Asian Remedy for Menstrual Cramps - Connecticut,
1997, 48 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Rep. 27, (1999) (discussing Koo Sar), availa-
ble at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00056277.htm.
132. Some lead-cored candle wicks emit relatively large amounts of lead into the
air during burning, placing children who inhaled the vaporized lead at risk. "Some of
the candles tested ... emitted lead levels in excess of 3,000 micrograms per hour -
about seven times the rate that could lead to elevated levels of lead in a child." Press
Release, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, CPSC Bans Candles With Lead-
Cored Wicks, Release No. 03-105 (Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/
cpscpub/prerel/prhtml03/03105.html; see also Metal-Cored Candle Wicks Containing
Lead and Candles With Such Wicks; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 67 FED. REG.
20062 (Apr. 24, 2002); Metal-Cored Candle Wicks Containing Lead and Candles With
Such Wicks; Final Rule, 68 FED. REG. 19142 (Apr. 18, 2003) (to be codified at 16
C.F.R. pt. 1500).
133. Figure from, Comm. on Lead in the Human Envt., Lead in the Human Envi-
ronment, 35 (1980).
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using liability as a tool of social engineering, as opposed to a trust-
worthy legal principle supported by reliable scientific proof.
b. Many Variables can Affect an Individual's IQ
In research studies, every variable except the focus of the re-
search (i.e., lead), is known as a confounder.' 34 In order to make
134. When one variable is studied to try to explain another, the relationship be-
tween them may be biased by a third variable. The bias, known as 'confounding,' is
common and must be minimized in research. When present, confounders result in a
biased estimate of the effect of exposure on disease. "The bias can be negative-result-
ing in underestimation of the exposure effect-or positive, and can even reverse the
apparent direction of effect. It is a concern no matter what the design of the study or
what statistic is used to measure the effect of exposure." Roseanne McNamee, Con-
founding and Confounders, 60 OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 227 (2003).
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the claim that lead directly effects IQ, researchers must identify,
account for and control all the confounders. Anything less merely
means that the researcher has only documented an "association"
or an "observation" between what was being looked at (i.e., IQ or
behavior) and the object of the study (i.e., exposure to lead). This
does not belittle the researchers' work because "associations" are
important in learning. But claims of "associations" are a lot differ-
ent from claims of "causation."135
Scientists have been trying since the iaid-1960s to under-
stand how lead effects the central nervous system at sub-chronic
levels of exposure. While significant research advances have been
made in animal studies over the last four decades, there are
problems with extrapolating the results of these animal studies
and applying them to children. 136 For example, "[a]nimal studies
show that alterations in neurobehavioral function can persist long
after lead exposure has stopped and [blood lead] levels have re-
turned to normal," but scientists have been unable to duplicate
these results in human studies. 37 In its 2006 Lead Criteria Docu-
ment, the EPA notes that "[hIuman studies provide little informa-
tion on the persistence of effects that lead may have on the
135. To date, it appears that researchers have been observing "associations" be-
tween persons who have been exposed to lead and IQ deficits or behavior problems.
See Lanphear testimony, supra note 114. According to Dr. Lanphear:
Schwartz reported that lead-associated cognitive deficits and hearing loss
occur at blood lead levels below 10 mg/dL. In a meta-analysis, the ob-
served decrement was greater for studies with children having blood lead
levels below 15 mg/dL compared to those with children having higher
blood lead levels. In an analysis of NHANES III, the lead-associated read-
ing deficit increased, from -1.0 point per 1 mg/dL increase in blood lead
for the entire sample to -1.7 point per 1 mg/dL increase for the subgroup
with blood lead levels below 5 mg/dL. In a prospective study, an increase
in lifetime mean blood lead level from <1 to 10 mg/dL was associated with
a 7.4 point IQ deficit. Moreover, consistent with the earlier studies, the
lead-associated cognitive deficits associated with each 1 mg/dL increase
in blood lead level were greater at blood lead concentrations below 10 mg/
dL (18, 20-22). Although there are several plausible mechanisms to ex-
plain these findings, the specific mechanism is unclear.
Id. (emphasis added & internal citations omitted). Note that at the end of his testi-
mony discussing IQ deficits, Dr. Lanphear clarifies his "associations" and "observa-
tion" regarding humans by stating that "there are several plausible mechanisms to
explain these findings." Id. Each of those several mechanisms are confounders.
136. CRITERIA DOCUMENT, supra note 115, at 5-18. The EPA delicately addresses
this problem by noting that "[wihile significant research advances have been made in
animal studies over the last four decades, relating these findings to neurotoxicity in
children has been challenging and difficult." Id.
137. Id. at 5-19.
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brain."138 There can be multiple reasons why scientists are having
such a difficult time studying the effects of low level exposures to
lead on the brain. Some believe the principal problem is lead's
"multiple toxic mechanisms of action in brain tissue, which en-
compass variable, overlapping, and, at times, opposing dose-effect
relationships. " 139 The problem could also be a result of factors that
confound the studies. Or, the reason why the scientists have been
unable to duplicate the results of the animal studies in man is
simply because "man is not a big mouse. 14 °
Of all the confounders, one of the most complex and most im-
portant appears to be the social and economic status of the child
("SES"). Moreover, one the most significant SES confounder with
respect to a child's IQ is their mother's IQ.14' The exact mecha-
nisms of the impact of SES on lead's neurotoxic effects on the cen-
tral nervous system are unknown. Individually or collectively,
factors such as poverty, pre-1960 housing in segregated communi-
ties, ethnicity, and nutritional deficiencies can contribute to neu-
rological problems. 42 One noted researcher has admitted that
complete confounder control is impossible in real world studies. As
a result, in most studies reviewed, control of confounders has re-
duced the magnitude of the lead-IQ effect. But, he also notes that
it has not obliterated the lead-IQ effect.' 43 This reduction was
138. Id.
139. Id. at 5-18.
140. See ROBERT SCOTT, OF MICE AND MEN: EXTRAPOLATION OF ANIMAL DATA TO
HUMANs (Def. Res. Inst. April 30, 1998) (noting that there are many biologic and bio-
chemical differences among mammals and even substantial differences in responses
among similar species of rodents within the subspecies of the same species; thus, if
extrapolation between the same animal species is a delicate exercise, extrapolations
from animals to humans raise even greater questions).
141. CRITERIA DOCUMENT, supra note 11155, at 6-266.
142. Id. at E-9, 4-21, 4-80, 5-71, 5-102 to -103. Historically, the SES confounders
were measured rather crudely in most studies with such indices as the Hollingshead
Four-Factor Index of Social Position that incorporates education and income of both
parents. In an effort to better control for confounding by SES more recent lead studies
have incorporated more direct assessments such as the HOME scale, parental intelli-
gence, parental attitude assessments, and measures of parental substance abuse and
psychopathology. Id. at 6-73 to -74.
143. Herbert L. Needleman & C.A. Gatsonis, Low-level lead exposure and the IQ of
children. A meta-analysis of modern studies, 263 J. Am. Med. Assoc. 673-78 (1990). It
is often the case that following adjustment for factors such as social class, parental
neurocognitive function, and child rearing environment using covariates such as pa-
rental education, income, and occupation, parental IQ, and HOME scores, the lead
coefficients are substantially reduced in size and statistical significance. CRITERIA
DOCUMENT, supra note 115, at 6-75. In the Port Pirie study, I. Shilu Tong & Ying Lu,
Identification of Confounders in the Assessment of the Relationship Between Lead Ex-
posure and Child Development, 11 ANNALS OF. EPIDEMIOLOGY 38, 45 (2001), the au-
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even noted in Dr. Lanphear's pooled analysis of seven prospective
studies 44 where the lead affect on IQ has been characterized as
modest after an attempt was made to account for the confound-
ers. 145 It has even been noted that blood lead typically accounts
for only 1 to 4% of the variance in child IQ scores, compared to the
40% or more by social and parenting factors. 146
3. Defining the Appropriate Market is Problematic
In DES cases, the market was narrowly tailored to consist of
DES manufacturers who sold the product during the nine-month
window during the plaintiffs mother's pregnancy. 147 Nationally,
there were only about 300 known manufacturers of DES. 148 In
lead paint cases, a national market is not as easily defined. It is
not so easily defined because the plaintiffs cannot identify when
the lead paint was applied, therefore they cannot narrow the time
period in which to apply the "market share" theory.
In DES cases, plaintiffs knew when their mothers ingested
the drug and thus when the product was sold. In contrast, plain-
tiffs in lead paint cases assert that they are unable to identify the
particular year or years in which paint was applied to the interior
of the house. Therefore, they ask courts to use the age of the hous-
ing to set the appropriate time period for the market. Unsurpris-
ingly, the period at issue can be in excess of 50 years and may
require defendants to prove they never sold paint as long ago as
1900.149 It is one thing to determine a reasonable market share
thors "observed that adjustment for four factors (i.e., quality of home environment,
SES, maternal intelligence, and parental smoking behavior) reduced the magnitude
of the estimated association between lead and IQ by 40% and inclusion of additional
factors resulted in another 10% reduction." CRITERIA DOCUMENT, supra note 115, at 6-
265.
144. See Lanphear testimony, supra note 114.
145. "[Tlhe crude coefficient for concurrent lead and childhood IQ score was -4.66
(95% CI: -5.72, -3.60), while the coefficient adjusted for study site, quality of the home
environment (HOME score), birth weight, maternal IQ, and maternal education was -
2.70 (95% CI: -3.74, -1.66). When expressed as the percentage of variance accounted
for in a health outcome, the contributions of lead have been characterized as modest
in magnitude." CRITERIA DOCUMENT, supra note 115, at 6-265.
146. Id. at 6-265 to -266 (citing K. Koller et al., Recent Developments in Low-Level
Lead Exposure and Intellectual Impairment in Children, 112 ENV'L HEALTH PER-
SPECTWVES 987-94 (2004)).
147. See supra note 41 and accompanying discussion.
148. See Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1072.
149. See, e.g., Brenner, A.D.2d at 172 (defining the relevant market period to be
"between 1926, the year the house was built, and 1955, the year lead-based paint was
no longer available for interior residential use."); Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 562 (defin-
2008]
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during a nine-month period, but it is a far different and more com-
plex problem to determine the market share for during a period in
excess of a century where multiple manufacturers have entered
and exited the market. 150 Courts considering this issue have rea-
soned that even if plaintiffs could determine each defendant's av-
erage market share during the relevant market period, "the
application of such percentages would result in the possibility of
assessing liability against a manufacturer that was not in the
market at the time the lead-based paint was used in plaintiffs'
residence."15 This is a reason learned commentators advise that
"the greater the span of time within which the potentially injury-
causing product was sold, the less suited market share liability
will be."1 52
From a practical standpoint, some courts encountered funda-
mental problems attempting to apply the "market share" liability
theory. For example, a Los Angeles trial judge "expressed exasper-
ation with the task of attempting to formulate market shares after
spending over four weeks examining the DES market." 53 Plain-
tiffs argued that the difficulty the trial judge in Los Angeles exper-
ienced could be attributed to the uncooperativeness of the
defendants. But, the court noted that the Los Angeles judge "be-
gan his analysis of the situation by thanking the parties for all
their cooperation and for the highly professional manner in which
the case was presented.' 54 The judge then . . . criticize[d] those
who developed the "market share" theory because of their obvious
lack of trial experience or knowledge as to what would go into
proving a case based on the theory."1 55
To make matters more complicated, in most lead paint cases,
the plaintiff is complaining about childhood lead poisoning where
ing the relevant market period to be between 1900, the year one of the relevant
houses was built, and 1978, the year federal government banned lead paint).
150. Gifford, supra note 26, at 130 (noting that neither "plaintiffs nor defendants
possess the necessary records to determine the market shares of lead paint or lead
pigment in 1880, 1900, or 1920.").
151. Brenner v. American Cyanamid Co., 699 N.Y.S.2d 848, 853 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999).
152. DAVID G. OWEN et al., supra note 69, at § 24:7.
153. See Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 337 (Ill. 1990) (quoting Stapp v.
Abbott Laboratories, No. C 344407 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, Cal.)) ("'The
harsh blunt fact that the evidence has shown is that that information and data is just
not available' and "when the Supreme Court, * * * without having any evidence says
that you can determine what the [sales are] as to a particular manufacturer, it's just,
just not there. That data doesn't exist.'").
154. Id.
155. Id. at 338.
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the injury is allegedly caused by paint located inside their homes.
In order to appropriately and narrowly tailor the market share of
the lead pigment manufacturers, a court should exclude from the
market share data all lead pigment used in paint sold for any use
other then interior residential use. Thus, the court should exclude
from the relevant market all paint sold for industrial use (i.e.,
paint sold for use in refineries, steel mills, boatyards, food process-
ing plants, chemical plants, fabricating shops, storage tanks, and
all types of factories, etc.) and commercial use (i.e., paint used in
shops, malls, office buildings, governmental buildings, barns,
churches, restaurants, gas stations, warehouses, boats, etc.). It
should exclude lead pigment used to cover the exterior of build-
ings, bridges, and homes. It should exclude paint used on signs,
cars and road stripes. But it is highly likely that (1) lead pigment
manufacturers did not know in what types of products paint man-
ufacturers placed their products or in what concentrations and (2)
paint manufacturers did not inquire about or track the purpose for
which their customers (professional painters and other customers)
used the paint they purchased. This makes it difficult, if not im-
possible, to define the appropriate market in lead paint litigation
and makes it even more likely that the application of such per-
centages would result in the possibility of assessing liability
against a manufacturer at a level disproportionate with their
product use in the interior of residential homes.
If courts allow juries to "apportion damages when reliable in-
formation is not available, the clear result will be arbitrary deter-
minations and wide variances between judgments, without
sufficient explanations for the differences. " 156 Without narrowly
tailored, accurate and adequate evidence, apportioning damages
will be inherently unfair. 157 Under these circumstances, it is pos-
sible-even likely-that the manufacturer that actually sold the
product will not be before the court. Some manufacturers may not
be served, have gone out of business, have merged with other com-
panies and due to successor liability laws cannot be held liable for
sales of lead paint, or are not amenable to suit in the forum
156. Id. at 338.
157. See id.; see also Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 283-84 (Fla. 1990);
George v. Parke-Davis, 733 P.2d 507, 512 (market should be as narrow as possible to
impose liability on only those companies most likely to have produced drug that
caused plaintiffs harm). But see Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 728 (Haw.
1991); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1077 (N.Y. 1989).
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state. 158 To impose liability when it is quite possible (or probable)
that defendants are not before the court is an unacceptably specu-
lative exercise. 159
4. Manufacturers did not have Exclusive Control
Over the Risk Produced by the Lead Pigment
In DES cases, the plaintiffs sued the manufacturers and mar-
keters of the offending drug. These manufacturers were found to
have exclusive control over any risk produced by their product.
There was no change in the drug from the point of manufacture to
the point of ingestion by the patient. 60 In lead paint litigation,
however, lead pigment manufacturers are being sued for selling
the lead pigment in bulk to paint manufacturers. They are not nec-
essarily the manufacturers or marketers of the allegedly offending
paint. The paint manufacturers are the entities which decided the
particular pigments to use in their paints, and they also deter-
mined the quantities that were actually used. The lead pigment
suppliers, therefore, did not and could not have controlled all of
the risks that their products may have presented to the public.' 6 '
Moreover, DES manufacturers intended that their product be in-
gested by pregnant women to prevent miscarriages. Certainly,
white lead carbonate or lead-based paint is not intended for inges-
158. Smith v. Eli Lilly, 560 N.E.2d at 338. Even if a "successor" can somehow be
deemed responsible under traditional principles merely by the accident of being in the
chain of ownership by participating in a remote transaction, applying "market share"
liability to such a defendant is flatly inconsistent with the principles of "market
share" liability. Such a defendant did not manufacture the product, did not partici-
pate in the market, and may not be in a position currently to purchase insurance for
those remote sales to justify allocating the successor a portion of the responsibility.
Holding such a party responsible stacks one fiction on top of another-first using the
convenient fiction of "successor" liability to establish liability for the remote sales by
another company, and then using the "market share" fiction to shift the burden of
proof and allocate responsibility for a market in which the successor never partici-
pated. Surely, this is a "bridge too far." See CORNELIUS RYAN, A BRIDGE Too FAR 9
(Simon & Schuster 1974) (telling the story of the failed Allied attempt to break
through German lines at Arnhem in the occupied Netherlands during World War II.
The book's title comes from a comment made by British Lt. Gen. Frederick Browning,
deputy commander of the First Allied Airborne Army, who told Field Marshal Ber-
nard Montgomery before the operation, "I think we may be going a bridge too far.").
159. Smith v. Eli Lilly, 560 N.E.2d at 338 (citing Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F.
Supp. 1004, 1007, 1018 (D.S.C. 1981).
160. Id.
161. Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Company, 782 F. Supp. 186, 195 (D. Mass.
1992) (plaintiff acknowledging that the paint manufacturers were the ones that de-
cided what amount of lead pigment to use, and whether to use any lead pigment at
all, knew the hazards associated with lead paint, and controlled the packaging of the
paint and the warnings placed thereon).
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss1/4
LEAD PAINT LITIGATION
tion and obviously was not marketed for such use.162 Finally, and
of great importance, owners and landlords of residences had con-
trol of a substantial portion of the risks posed by lead-based
paints-simply because lead-based paint is not hazardous until it
is neglected to the point where it peels and flakes and is then in-
gested or the dust inhaled. 163 Owners and landlords can eliminate
this risk simply by properly maintaining their property. 164
B. The Wisconsin Exception
In 2005, in Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment motion allowing a
childhood lead paint claim to go forward to trial against lead-pig-
ment manufacturers despite the plaintiffs inability to identify
which manufacturers caused his injury. 165 For the purposes of
their summary judgment motion, the defendants conceded that
the plaintiff could prove that he was injured by lead ingestion and
that his source of lead ingestion was lead paint.166
In reversing the summary judgment Wisconsin's Supreme
Court became the first court in the nation to allow such a case to
go forward by eliminating the causation requirement in lead paint
by extending "market share" liability to lead paint litigation. The
dissent in this case described Wisconsin's version of lead paint
"market share" liability as a type of absolute liability by creating
an irrebuttable presumption of causation.167 As one commentator
has noted:
This is, then, a form of collective tort liability untethered to any
actual responsibility for the specific harm asserted, imposed by
the judiciary as a matter of loss-distribution policy in response
to an admittedly serious public health problem. As Justice Wil-
cox observed in his dissent, "[tihe end result of the majority
opinion is that the defendants, lead pigment manufacturers, can
162. Brenner v. American Cyanamid Co., 699 N.Y.S.2d 848, 853 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999).
163. Id.
164. Id. Legislatures in many jurisdictions have enacted laws to prevent or miti-
gate childhood lead poisoning that place responsibility upon landowners to remediate
the effects of deteriorated lead-based paint. See, e.g., Lead Poisoning Prevention Act,
410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/1 - 45/17 (West 2000); Lead Poisoning Prevention Act,
R.I. GEN LAWS § 23-24.6 (2005); Lead Hazard Mitigation Act, R.I. GEN LAWS § 42-
128.1 (2006).
165. Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523 (Wis. 2005).
166. Id. at 580 (Wilcox, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 575.
20081
43
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
be held liable for a product they may or may not have produced,
which may or may not have caused the plaintiffs injuries, based
on conduct that may have occurred over 100 years ago when
some of the defendants were not even part of the relevant
market."168
1. The Court Focused on the State's Constitutional
Requirement that Injured Plaintiffs Must Have
Legal Remedies
Wisconsin law is unique in that the state's constitution guar-
antees every person a legal remedy for all injuries or wrongs. 169
Because of this constitutional guarantee, the Thomas court was
troubled by the possibility of "permitting possibly negligent de-
fendants to escape liability to an innocent, injured plaintiff. 170 It
had "serious concerns" with the effect blaming the landlords will
have on the adequacy of a plaintiffs remedy. 7 1 It stated that al-
though landlords have a legal duty to test for lead paint, Wiscon-
sin case law recognized that a pollution exclusion clause bars
coverage for lead poisoning from neglected paint. Thus, it was
afraid that many victims of lead poisoning would be deprived of an
effective remedy for their harm.1 72 The court was also of the opin-
ion that a certificate stating a dwelling was lead-safe would
wrongly immune the landlord from liability because a lead-safe
dwelling still poses a danger of lead poisoning from lead paint.173
Consequently, the court concluded that former lead pigment
manufacturers "are in a better position to absorb the cost of the
injury. They can insure themselves against liability, absorb the
damage award, or pass the cost along to the consuming public as a
cost of doing business."1 74 The Thomas court was acutely aware
that its decision would unjustly place liability on innocent defend-
168. See Diane S. Sykes, Hallows Lecture: Reflections on the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 723, 731 (2006).
169. WiS. CONST. art. I, § 9. ("Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in laws
for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character,
he ought to obtain justice freely, and without being obligated to purchase it, com-
pletely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws.")
170. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 549 (citing Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37
(Wis. 1984)).
171. Id. at 552.
172. Id. (citations omitted).
173. Id. at 553 (reasoning that "'a loaded pistol is a dangerous weapon, even when
it is locked up in a gun case, and a mamba is a deadly poisonous snake, even when it
is confined in a reptile house."') (citations omitted).
174. Id. at 558.
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ants.175 But, it believed that this is "a price the defendants, and
perhaps ultimately society, must pay to provide the plaintiff an
adequate remedy under the law."176
To accomplish its objective, the court glossed over, disagreed
with, or disregarded by distinguishing away every reason why all
other courts addressing this issue have refused to extend "market
share" liability to lead paint litigation. One dissenting justice even
raised serious, substantive and procedural due process problems,
as well as equal protection problems with the court's decision. 177
The majority ignored these problems by finding that they were not
ripe for adjudication. 178
2. Accepting Plaintiff's Alleged Facts as True, the
Court Disregarded the Fungible Nature of Lead
The Thomas court acknowledged that DES was a fungible
drug and that lead paint is made according to differing formulae.
But, the court observed that "fungibility" is not a term that can be
defined with categorical precision.' 79 Citing a 2004 article by Al-
len Rostron °8 0 that advocates the extension of market-share liabil-
ity for nonfungible products, the Thomas court adopted his
argument that a product can be fungible three different ways: a
product can be chemically identical (e.g., DES); it can in used in-
175. See id. at 565. "This procedure is not perfect and could result in drawing in
some defendants who are actually innocent, particularity given the significantly
larger time span at issue ..... Id. "We continue to believe that this procedure will
result in a pool of defendants which can reasonably be assumed 'could have caused
the plaintiffs injuries'" Id. (citing Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 52) (emphasis added). "[Olur
application of Collins here achieves Collins' requirement that it be shown that the
defendant pigment manufacturer 'reasonably could have contributed in some way to
the actual injury.'" Id. (citing Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 49 n.10) (emphasis added).
176. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 565 (quoting Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 49 n.10).
177. Id. at 591-97 (Prosser, J., dissenting). Procedural due process is violated be-
cause the court's decision denies defendants the opportunity to present a defense
under well settled tort theory because it sets up an irrebutable presumption of causa-
tion raising the very real possibility that innocent defendants will be held liable for
wrongs they did not commit. Id. at 593, 595. Substantive due process is violated be-
cause its "complete disregard for longstanding principles of tort liability certainly
'shocks the conscience'. . ." by imposing ex post facto liability on the defendants for
activities long past. Id. at 595-96 (citing Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498
(1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). The equal protection clause is violated because the
court's decision does not "treat like cases alike" because it makes companies still in
business bear a disproportionate share of the liability. Id. at 596 (citing Vacco v. Quill,
521 U.S. 793 (1997)).
178. Id. at 567.
179. Id. at 561.
180. Allen Rostron, Beyond Market Share Liability: A Theory of Proportional Share
Liability for Nonfungible Products, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 151 (2004).
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terchangeably, functionally or physically, because of its generic
status; or it can present a uniformity of risk.181
When considering the uniformity of risk in a summary judg-
ment context, the court accepted as fact the plaintiffs expert's
opinion that formula differences between types of lead paint do
not affect its bioavailability (thus, all lead paint present the same
risk of harm) because lead paint is "inherently hazardous."18 2 As a
result, the court concluded that like DES, all white lead carbonate
based paints are inherently dangerous.' 8 3 Consequently, it re-
jected using the chemical identity of the lead paint at issue as a
basis for not applying "market share" liability in this case.18 4 The
Thomas court held that to present a uniformity of risk, such that a
product is deemed fungible, it only needs to have a "common domi-
nator in the formulas." For lead paint-that common dominator is
lead. 8 5 At least one commentator has noted that on a scale of uni-
formity of risks, this holding (requiring only a common toxin) is
very over-inclusive. 8 6
The majority of the Thomas court described its holding in this
regard as preventing a "triumph of form over substance."'1 7 The
181. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 559-60. The Thomas court described functional inter-
changeability as follows: "'for signaling New Year's Eve, a blast of an auto horn and
one from a saxophone may be equivalent as noise, but few would want to dance to the
former.'" Id. at 560 (quoting Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 32 F. Supp. 2d 47, 51 (E.D.N.Y.
1998)). Functional interchangeability was used in tainted blood cases as a basis for
applying market-share liability even though not all blood products posed an
equivalent risk (like DES) because some were tainted and some were not. See Gifford,
supra note 26, at 138-39.
182. Id. at 559-60. In a footnote, the court recognized that defendant's expert
opined that differing lead formulae have differing bioavailability, but held that on
summary judgment, the court is to construe facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Id. at 560 n.47.
183. Id. at 560.
184. Id. at 559-60. See also Rostron, supra note 180, at 168.
185. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 559-60. The court also concluded that the plaintiff
alleged that white lead carbonate was functionally interchangeable because all forms
of it were lead pigments. Id. at 561. It held that white lead carbonate is physically
indistinguishable because consumers cannot tell the differences between types of it.
Id. at 561-62. It also held that all white lead carbonate have a uniformity of risk
because it was made from "virtually identical chemical formulas." Id. at 562.
186. Gifford, supra note 26, at 144 (noting that the scale goes from zero variance
[chemically identical] to over-inclusive [requiring only a common toxin] as is now all
that is required in Wisconsin).
187. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 560. The dissent notes that in Wisconsin, all finished
products containing a common raw material are now fungible. Under this rationale,
victims of a shooting who cannot identify a gun manufacturer could sue all steel com-
panies, a person injured by a drain cleaner could sue all producers of sodium hydrox-
ide, and one who is injured in a fire started by matches could sue all producers of
sulfur. Id. at 585.
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dissent, however, complained that the majority's focus on white
lead carbonate conveniently ignores the existence of other types of
lead in paint even though the defendants argued that the plaintiff
could not prove his harm was caused by white lead carbonate and
the plaintiff himself admitted that he had no proof of the type of
lead product that caused his injuries.""' According to the dissent,
the record establishes that a variety of leaded pigments were used
in interior painting including: basic lead carbonate, basic lead sul-
fate, lead chromates, leaded zinc oxides, lead silicates, lead tita-
nates, and litharage. It reflected that some painters used mixtures
that contained lead-free pigments but contained leaded dryers or
thinners.18 9 In fact, the dissent points out that plaintiffs expert
could only opine that the plaintiff probably ingested basic lead
carbonate because it was contained in the majority of interior
paints.1 90 Nonetheless, the majority concluded on this record that,
as a matter of law, the plaintiffs injuries were caused by basic
lead carbonate. The dissent, however, complained that it is one
thing to hold multiple defendants liable for a product they all pro-
duced when the only issue is which one of the defendants pro-
duced the specific product that caused the injury, but it is quite
another to hold them all liable when the plaintiff cannot even es-
tablish that their product caused his injuries.1 9'
3. The Court Skirted Around Other Factors
a. No Signature Injury is Required
According to the majority, "harm is harm, whether it be 'sig-
nature' or otherwise."192 In Wisconsin, the plaintiff always retains
the burden of establishing causation. In this case, the plaintiff
still has to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that basic
lead carbonate caused his injuries. After that showing the plain-
tiff's burden is relaxed only in that he does not have to prove
whose white lead carbonate he ingested.1 93 As long as a defendant
made white lead carbonate at any time between 1900 and 1978, it
is liable.
188. Id. at 580 (Wilcox, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 581.
190. Id. (noting that "[gleneral statistics do not establish causation in a specific
case") (citations omitted).
191. Id. at 583.
192. Id. at 563.
193. Id.
20081 193
47
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
b. Control of the Product is Immaterial
The Wisconsin court concluded that because lead is fungible
and inherently dangerous, the harm existed the moment the white
lead carbonate was created. If anything, the harm was diluted
when the paint manufacturers mixed it into their paint. 194 The
dissent disagrees based on the fact that "differing formulae of lead
paint has a direct bearing on how much damage a lead paint man-
ufacturer's product would cause."195
4. The Result
Because the Thomas decision was made in the context of a
summary judgment motion, the defendants should be given an op-
portunity to rebut the plaintiffs expert's claim that all lead paint
products present the same uniformity of risk. If they are success-
ful, they will be in a position to argue that "market share" liability
should not be applied to lead paint litigation in Wisconsin using
the analysis laid out in the Thomas decision.
But, if the defendants are not given the opportunity to rebut
the plaintiffs expert or if the court ignores the widely varying
risks presented by the differing lead paint formulas, then Wiscon-
sin's new risk contribution theory very likely will function as a
form of absolute liability for the manufacturers of lead pigment. In
lead-paint cases (as contrasted to Wisconsin's use of market-share
liability in DES cases) the opportunity for the defendant manufac-
turers to exculpate themselves may be almost nonexistent.196 The
majority in Thomas made it clear that the relevant time period for
lead-paint risk contribution liability is not the time period of the
plaintiffs exposure but the entire time period each house with
lead paint existed. In Thomas, the lead paint present in the three
houses where the plaintiff lived could have been applied at any
time between 1900 and 1978.197 Apportioning risk contribution li-
ability among manufacturers of lead pigment based on market
share and relative culpability over a 78-year period of time is
194. Id. at 563.
195. Id. at 583-84 (Wilcox, J., dissenting) (citing Skipworth, 690 A.2d at 173).
196. "In DES cases each drug company had (at least in theory) a meaningful oppor-
tunity to defend against liability by proving it did not produce or market the drug
either where the plaintiff lived or during the specific nine-month period she was ex-
posed." Diane S. Sykes, Hallows Lecture: Reflections on the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 723, 730 (2006).
197. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 562.
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nearly impossible as a purely factual matter leaving defendants
no ability to defend themselves.
V. MANY POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
APPLYING "MARKET SHARE" LIABILITY ARE
MISPLACED
When applying an alternative theory of liability, courts con-
sider the two policy reasons initially cited in Summers for shifting
the burden of proof: (1) "as between an innocent plaintiff and neg-
ligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of the injury,"
and (2) that the theory would create an incentive to produce safer
products. 198 Additionally, in the context of public nuisance litiga-
tion, governmental agencies openly admit that the goal of this liti-
gation is about securing additional funding. This section examines
the practical, legal and moral underpinnings of these reasons for
applying "market share" liability in lead paint litigation.
A. In Lead Paint Cases, Is It Material-or Unjust-to
Consider Whether Defendants Are Better
Positioned to Absorb the Cost?
One of the main bases relied upon by some courts in adopting
"market share" liability is the reasoning that defendants are bet-
ter able to insure against liability and to pass the costs on.199
Courts and commentators alike have questioned the fairness of
this basis for imposing "market share" liability.200 Indeed, it is
morally wrong and unjust for courts to base their decision not on
the merits of the case and the applicable law, but on the supposed
wealth and ability of a defendant (or that of an entire industry) to
pay a damage award to a plaintiff. The "ability to pay" (whether
by insurance or otherwise) should be immaterial to a court's deci-
sion as should the perceived ability to "pass the cost" of a damage
award off to its customers. Once a court starts down those roads,
198. Id. at 549-50
199. See, e.g., id. at 558.
200. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 941 (Cal. 1980) (Richardson,
J., dissenting) (imposition based on defendant's perceived wealth is an unsound prin-
ciple and creates a two-tiered system of justice); Elliot M. Kroll, Intra-Industry Joint
Liability: The Era of Absolute Products Liability, 687 INS. L. J. 185, 195 (1980) (it is
an unsound principle to impose liability based on the perceived wealth of defendant
and its ability to obtain insurance); Jonathan B. Newcomb, Comment, Market Share
Liability for Defective Products: An Ill-Advised Remedy for the Problem of Identifica-
tion, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 300, 328 (1981) (it is an unfair system to impose liability solely
due to ability to pay and subsequently spread the costs).
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the paradigm clearly changes from jurisprudence to "result-ori-
ented" social engineering-and the resulting decrees transform
manufacturers into insurers not only of their own products but
also those made by others in the industry.20 1
A number of courts and commentators have suggested that
debates about who should pay to remedy such problems are most
appropriately left for the legislature, with its ability to hold hear-
ings and determine public policy.20 2 This is particularly true in
the context of public nuisance cases where governmental plaintiffs
are asking courts to find defendants liable for a public nuisance
(the mere presence of lead paint on houses in the community) and
asking courts to apply "market share" liability to determine each
defendant's liability for abating the nuisance. When lead paint is
involved, public officials often face legions of conflicts with federal
and state public policy priorities. For example, laws and regula-
tions in some states place "primary responsibility" for minimizing
the risks of deteriorating lead paint on property owners, including
landlords.20 3 Despite this mandate from the legislative and execu-
tive branches of government, public servants-themselves part of
the executive branch-find themselves arguing that the manufac-
turers of lead paint should be held responsible, and incredibly as-
sert the extreme argument that property owners are not even
appropriate parties to the trial.20 4 How can a public official,
charged with enforcing the state laws against the persons prima-
rily responsible for a condition, ignore that duty and pursue a
"common law" judicial remedy solely against the manufacturers-
who have no ability to control the deterioration that has produced
the alleged risk?
The question is more than rhetorical. It points out an inher-
ent conflict of public counsel that arises when they arbitrarily ig-
nore the declared "public policy" they are sworn to uphold-and
attempt to create public policy based on their personal views
201. See Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 342 (Ill. 1990) (citing Mulcahy,
386 N.W.2d at 76; Elliot M. Kroll, Intra-Industry Joint Liability: The Era of Absolute
Products Liability, 687 INs. L. J. 185, 194-97 (1980)).
202. See Smith v. Eli Lilly, 560 N.E.2d at 342. See also Goldman v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691, 701 (Ohio 1987); Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d
67, 76 (Iowa 1986); Cynthia L. Chase, Note, Market Share Liability: A Plea for Legis-
lative Alternatives, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 1003, 1004 (1982).
203. See, e.g., souces cited supra notes 7 & 8.
204. Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., No. 99-5226 2004 WL 4963044 (R.I.
Super. Mar. 22, 2004) (severing all of the Defendants' third-party claim from the
trial).
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through judicial decree. The problems are exacerbated if public
counsel, and the agencies they are responsible for as clients, fail to
take action to reduce risks by enforcing existing statutes and reg-
ulations enacted and promulgated to protect public health-pur-
suing the perceived panacea of "common law" remedies for years
in protracted litigation, while the "dangers" they claim remain un-
resolved as a result of their own indifference. It seems reasonable
that such dereliction would have political consequences, and per-
haps the dogged and unjust pursuit of extreme remedies in lead
paint cases, such as "market share" liability, demonstrates just
how far elected officials will go to avoid them.
B. When the Product is no Longer Made, There can be
no Incentive to Make it Safer
Although some courts and commentators believe "market
share" liability is necessary as an incentive for manufacturers to
produce safer products,20 5 other courts recognize that it is unlikely
that an overall safety incentive could result from imposing of
"market share" liability long after the product was discontin-
ued.20 6 This reasoning is particularly true in the context of lead
paint litigation where plaintiffs ask courts to apply "market
share" liability 75 to 200 years after the lead-based paint was
sold-more than 50 years after most companies stopped producing
lead-based paint and almost 30 years after its use was banned by
the federal government. The "marketing defects," if any, which
typically justify liability because of manufacturers' failures to pro-
vide adequate warnings and precautionary instructions, ring
hollow when the manufacturer is dealing with a product that is no
longer sold.
205. See, e.g., Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 49-50 (Wis. 1984); Sindell,
607 P.2d at 936; Glenn 0. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on
the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713, 741 (1982); John J. Grundhauser, Note, The DES
Manufacturer Identification Problem: A Florida Public Policy Approach, 40 U. MLMi
L. REV. 857, 867-70 (1986).
206. "[Ilt is unlikely that an overall safety incentive could result from imposition of
market share liability 40 years after the undesirable occurred and almost 20 years
after the potential harm was discovered and the product removed from the market."
Smith v. Eli Lilly, 560 N.E.2d at 342 (citing Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241,
247 (theory adds little incentive for production of safe products)).
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C. It is Not the Court's Job to Provide Funding for
Governmental Entities
Under common law, there exists a general rule that "public
expenditures made in the performance of governmental functions
are not recoverable" from a tortfeasor in the absence of a specific
statute.20 7 This rule against "municipal cost recovery" is rooted in
the legislative policy of taxing citizens to pay for these services
and on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. 208
"The seminal case on this doctrine is Flagstaff v. Atchison, To-
peka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.," 20 9 in which the city of Flagstaff, claim-
ing negligence and the conduct of an ultrahazardous activity,
attempted to recover from the railway the costs associated with
emergency response after the derailment of tank cars carrying ex-
plosive gas.210 Affirming the district court's dismissal of the com-
plaint, the court of appeals held that "the cost of public services for
protection from fire or safety hazards is to be borne by the public
as a whole, not assessed against the tortfeasor whose negligence
creates the need for the service."21' According to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals:
Where such services are provided by the government and the
costs are spread by taxes, the tortfeasor does not expect a de-
mand for reimbursement. This is so even though the tortfeasor
is fully aware that private parties injured by its conduct, who
207. Koch v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 468 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1210 (1985); see also Dist. of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077,
1080 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In re TMI Litig. Governmental Entities Claim, 544 F. Supp.
853, 855 (M.D. Pa. 1982); Pennsylvania v. Gen. Pub. Utils., 710 F.2d 117, 121 (3d Cir.
1983); People v. Wilson, 240 Cal. App. 2d 574, 576 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966); Freetown v.
New Bedford Wholesale Tire, Inc., 423 N.E.2d 997, 997-98 (Mass. 1981); Bridgeton v.
B.P. Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49, 54 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976).
208. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 332 U.S. 301,
314-15, (1947) (declining to recognize cause of action by federal government to re-
cover costs of injured soldier's hospitalization and pay resulting from negligence of
defendants and noting that Congress, not the Court, "is the custodian of the national
purse," and the "exclusive arbiter of federal fiscal affairs"); see also County of Cham-
paign v. Anthony, 337 N.E.2d 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975), affd, 356 N.E.2d 561 (1976)
(holding that the county could not recover from a criminal defendant the cost of pro-
viding protection to a witness against him).
209. Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1144 (Ill. 2004).
210. Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 719 F.2d 322, 323 (9th Cir.
1983).
211. Id. (applying Arizona law in a case of first impression). See also Koch, 468
N.E.2d at 7, 8 (in absence of statutory authority, city cannot recover wages, salaries,
and overtime paid to police, fire, and other municipal employees as a result of city-
wide blackout caused by defendant's negligence).
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cannot spread their risk to the general public, will have a cause
of action against it for damages proximately or legally
caused. 2
12
This concept, the Ninth Circuit said, is a product of state and
federal common law and "does not turn on the underlying theory
of the tort ... for it is the identity of the claimant and the nature
of the cost that combine to deny recovery." 213 Where a system al-
ready exists for the rational allocation of costs, and where society
as a whole relies upon that system, there is little reason for a
court to impose an entirely new system of allocation. Judicial ac-
tivism of this nature substantially upsets the settled expectations
of potential defendants, both business entities and individuals,
and their insurers. No matter how well intended, this type of judi-
cial activism could have significant unintended consequences. 214
With respect to the alleged lead paint health crisis, many leg-
islatures have addressed the problem21 5 and a fair and sensible
212. Flagstaff, 719 F.2d at 323. See also Chicago v. Beretta, 821 N.E.2d at 1144;
Bridgeton, 369 A.2d at 54 (holding in pertinent part: "Governments, to paraphrase
the Declaration of Independence, have been instituted among men to do for the public
go d those things which the people agree are best left to the public sector .... Never-
theless, there remains an area where the people as a whole absorb the cost of such
services-for example, the prevention and detection of crime. No one expects the ren-
dering of a bill (other than a tax bill) if a policeman apprehends a thief . . .")
Bridgeton further holds "that a municipal corporation may not recover as damages
the costs of its governmental operations which it was created to perform." Id. at
54-55.
213. Flagstaff, 719 F.2d at 324.
214. Chicago v. Beretta, 821 N.E.2d at 1144 (discussing unknown consequence of
allowing governmental entities to sue to recover of the costs of routine police and
other emergency services).
215. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1672 (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. §20-27-605
(2005); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124160 (West 1995); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 372 (West 1986); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-5-1103 (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§19a-llla (2003); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 16, § 2601 (2003); D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-871.01
(2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.984 (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-41-2 (2006); 410
ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/1 (2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-41-39.4 (2006); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 135.102 (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-1202, -1210 (2002); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 211.900 to 211.905 (LexisNexis 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.20 to
40.1299.29 (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1314 (2004); MD. CODE ANN. ENVIR.
§ 6-304 (2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 190 (2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 333.5474 (2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.9501 to 144.9509 (2005); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 701.300 (2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-2513 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 130-A
(1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:14A-8 (West 1971); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 1370 (Mc-
Kinney 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-131.7 to 130A-131.9C (1997); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3742 (LexisNexis 2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 36, § 1-114-1 (2004); OR. REV.
STAT. § 701 (2005); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903 (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-24.6
(2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-1430 (2002); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 88
(Vernon 2003); VT. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 1751 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-46.1 (West
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system for spreading costs is already in place. Thus, "governmen-
tal entities themselves currently bear the cost in question, and
they have taken no action to shift it elsewhere. If the government
has chosen to bear the cost for reasons of economic efficiency, or
even as a subsidy to the citizens and their business[es], the deci-
sion implicates fiscal policy; the legislature and its public deliber-
ative processes, rather than the court, is the appropriate forum to
address such fiscal concerns." 216
The Ninth Circuit, however, acknowledged several exceptions
to the municipal cost recovery rule that may permit a governmen-
tal entity to "recover the cost of its services." For example, recov-
ery is allowed "where the acts of a private party create a public
nuisance which the government seeks to abate.., and where the
government incurs expenses to protect its own property."21 7 In the
lead paint litigation, however, governmental entities typically do
not sue as property owners and they do not sue to abate a nui-
sance on public property. Instead, they sue to obtain funding for
abatement projects. Whether the desired "public nuisance" recov-
ery is cast in damages or in the form of an equitable abatement
injunction, the alleged nuisance is on private property. 218
Some jurisdictions have allowed governmental entities to sue
to recover its costs when ongoing misconduct is so pervasive and
continuing that it creates a public nuisance.21 9 But, other jurisdic-
2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.103.010 (West 2002); W. VA. CODE § 16-35-4a
(2006); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 254.15 (2004).
216. Flagstaff, 719 F.2d at 324 (citing Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 314-17). As the
District of Columbia appeals court noted:
It is critically important to recognize that the government's decision to
provide tax-supported services is a legislative policy determination. It is
not the place of the courts to modify such decisions. Furthermore, it is
within the power of the government to protect itself from extraordinary
emergency expenses by passing statutes or regulations that permit recov-
ery from negligent parties. In other words, the city clearly has recourse to
legislative initiative to eliminate or reduce the economic burdens of acci-
dents such as the Air Florida crash.
Dist. of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
217. Flagstaff, 719 F.2d at 324 (emphasis added).
218. See Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882, 894-95
(E.D.Pa. 2000) (explaining that the City cannot have it both ways; it is either suing in
its "governmental capacity to abate a public nuisance" or "[i]f it sues for costs it has
itself incurred the action is barred under the municipal cost recovery rule.").
219. Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1149-50 (Ohio 2002)
("Although a municipality cannot reasonably expect to recover the costs of city ser-
vices whenever a tortfeasor causes harm to the public, it should be allowed to argue
that it may recover such damages in this type of case. Unlike the train derailment
that occurred in the Flagstaff case, which was a single, discrete incident requiring a
200 [Vol. 25
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tions have rejected the idea that the municipal cost recovery rule
is limited to discrete events or that it should not be applied where
the harm is frequent or ongoing. In Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp, the court noted that
the need for emergency response to shootings is a day-to-day oc-
currence, well within the predictable need for law enforcement
and other municipal resources, while the risk of an explosion or
other disaster is unpredictable and may impose devastating
costs on a local government. Such a "single incident" does not
result in a merely "nominal expense" that can be spread across
the tax base without difficulty, as these cases would suggest....
It defies common sense to suggest that the more predictable the
expense, the greater the ability of the city to recover its costs in
tort. The potential unintended consequences of such a rule are
staggering. We agree with defendants that when the need for
emergency services in response to an alleged nuisance is ongo-
ing, the municipal cost recovery rule is stronger, not weaker, be-
cause the legislature is better able to consider need for cost-
recovery legislation than in cases of sudden disaster. If the legis-
lature concludes that the costs of a certain public service should
be borne by the parties whose conduct necessitates that service,
rather than by the taxpayers in general, it has the ability to en-
act a statute expressly authorizing recovery of such costs. 22 0
Courts should not forget that they are not legislatures. They
do not have the power to appropriate money through taxation to
fund government agencies efforts to remedy childhood lead
poisoning. While courts do have the power to transfer money from
one party to another, that power is supposed to be linked to proof
of a causal connection "between the injurer's tortious conduct and
the victim's injury." Therefore, courts must resist the temptation
single emergency response, the misconduct alleged in this case is ongoing and persis-
tent. The continuing nature of the misconduct may justify the recoupment of such
governmental costs .... Moreover, even the Flagstaff court recognized that recovery
by a governmental entity is allowed 'where the acts of a private party create a public
nuisance which the government seeks to abate.'") (quoting Flagstaff, 719 F.2d at 324).
See also Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 199902590, 2000 WL 1473568, *7-8
(Mass. Super. Ct. July 13, 2000) (distinguishing Flagstaff on basis that it involved a
discrete emergency); James v. Arms Technology, Inc., 3820 A.2d 27, 48-49 (N.J. App.
Div. 2003) (holding the municipal-cost-recovery rule should not apply to a claim alleg-
ing an ongoing public nuisance because the ongoing course of conduct alleged against
these defendants is distinguishable from the single incident at issue in Flagstaff).
220. Chicago v. Beretta, 821 N.E.2d at 1147 (stating that this was a question for
the legislature).
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to believe that they, more so than legislatures, are the appropriate
branch of government to solve public health problems. 221
VI. CHASING THE DEVIL? "ALTERNATIVE
LIABILITY" ON THE MARCH
The advocates of "alternative liability" and "market share" li-
ability are on the march. The concept's attraction to plaintiffs'
counsel is understandable. Although "market share" liability is
considered an extraordinary remedy-its "benefits" are also ex-
traordinary, primarily because it removes the plaintiffs burden to
establish the requisite causative links between a specific defen-
dant's tortious acts and the plaintiffs alleged injuries. Once that
fundamental burden is excused, plaintiffs argue that they only
need to demonstrate an injury-or, in some cases, only a potential
injury-associated with lead-based paint. Once this "feather-
weight" standard is allowed and, predictably, met, plaintiffs may
believe that they are on their way to bringing the lead industry to
its knees.222 Once the rule is accepted and established, they will
inevitably assert that all of the defendants who merely made lead
paint-as opposed to actually selling it in the state-during the
life span of the oldest dwelling in which the plaintiff lived (often
up to 100 years ago) are presumed "guilty" of harming the plain-
tiff. If this reasoning is upheld, each defendant is "presumed
guilty" unless it can prove that it never sold lead paint during
those 50, 75 or 100 years.
As of this writing, "market share" liability has been expressly
accepted in only six jurisdictions. 223 All other appellate courts
have rejected its application in lead paint cases. In five of the ju-
risdictions accepting "market share" liability, its only common ap-
plication has been in DES cases, and only one state has
authorized its application in lead paint litigation. Perhaps
uniquely, that jurisdiction-Wisconsin-based its application of
"market share" liability on the state's constitutional guarantee
that every person will have a legal remedy for all injuries or
221. See Gifford, supra note 26, at 159.
222. See Mark Curriden, Tobacco Fees Give Plaintiffs' Lawyers New Muscle for
Other Litigation, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 31, 1999; Michael Freedman, Turning
Lead into Gold, FORBES, May 14, 2001, at 122 (explaining that Mr. Motley targeted
the former lead companies as his "next big-game hunt," found victims, and "demon-
ized" the industry because they were a "fat target").
223. See supra section III. Those jurisdictions include: New York, Washington,
Florida, Wisconsin and Hawaii.
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wrongs.224 More importantly, the Wisconsin decision was made in
the context of a summary judgment motion, where facts presented
by the plaintiff were presumed true. Hence the court presumed
that the plaintiff could prove that he was injured by lead ingestion
and that his source of lead ingested was lead paint. Furthermore,
for the purposes of applying "market share" liability, the court
also accepted as fact the plaintiffs expert's opinion that that all
lead based paints present the same uniformity of risk. These pre-
sumed facts will not exist in a hotly contested trial. Thus, at trial,
Defendants will have an opportunity to challenge the applicability
of "market share" liability to lead paint litigation by rebutting
plaintiffs claim that lead paint presents an acceptable uniformity
of risk.
Nevertheless, the reasoning underlying "alternative liability"
has recently found receptive ears in the noted "public nuisance"
litigation in Rhode Island. There, a trial court has started its slide
down the "slippery slope"-not by expressly accepting "market
share" liability or any other specific type of "alternative liabil-
ity"-but by instructing the jury that they were not required to
find that any of the defendants sued in the case actually manufac-
tured any of the lead pigment present in the homes at issue.225 In
fact, the court went so far as to instruct the jury that defendants
could be found responsible even if there was no evidence that it
sold its paint in Rhode Island.226 Moreover, the court did not re-
quire a showing that any specific property contained lead paint,227
or that any specific property was sufficiently deteriorated or
poorly maintained to permit exposures to lead from paint.228 All
that the court required was some evidence the defendant manu-
factured lead paint and that it sold its product somewhere at some
time. Incredibly, the court did not even require proof to substanti-
ate the possibility that any particular defendant's product was
ever present in Rhode Island or used in any specific residence.
Based on these extraordinary instructions, the jury returned
a verdict that found that the paint manufacturers should be re-
quired to abate or suppress the "public nuisance."229 They did so
224. See supra section IV.B.
225. Jury Instructions from Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., C.A. No. 99-
5226, *14 (R.I. Super. 2006) (issued Feb. 13, 2006).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See id.
229. See Peter B. Lord, Three Companies Found Liable in Lead-Paint Nuisance
Suit, PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 23, 2006, at A-01. See also Peter Krouse, Verdict Raises
20081
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irrespective of Rhode Island's own regulations that declared that
the state's property owners were the persons "primarily responsi-
ble" for dealing with lead paint concerns. 230 The verdict is particu-
larly troubling because the landowners-the persons "primarily
responsible"-were not sued by the state and were not included on
the verdict form.231 Indeed, the court severed the manufacturers'
claims against the property owners from the proceedings before
the trial commenced. 232
On February 26, 2007, the court denied all defense post-trial
motions in the Rhode Island case. It took the court over one year
and 170 pages of a 198 page decision to explain why it has decided
that the multitude of alleged legal errors by the court and miscon-
duct on the part of the State either did not occur or were not seri-
ous enough to require a new trial. 233 In now appears that the
proceedings must still proceed into a "remedy" phase to determine
the type of abatement or suppression appropriate for the "nui-
sance." It is now up to appellate court to halt Rhode Island's head-
long plunge into the abyss-and to avoid the manifest injustice
compounded by the "cumulative presence" of so many rulings that
are antithetical to the traditions of balanced government and fun-
damental fairness. 234
Risk for Paint Companies, PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 2, 2006, at Al (including interviews
with jurors stating that some members of the jury did not want to find for liability,
but the jury instructions, according to one juror, "didn't give the paint companies
much of a window to crawl through."). Post-verdict interviews have indicated that the
jury was initially deadlocked four to two in favor of the defense, but that the court's
definitions in the jury instructions led them to find for liability. Id.
230. See supra note 8.
231. See Jury Verdict Form from Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., No. 99-
5226, 2004 WL 4963044 (R.I. Super. Feb. 22, 2006).
232. Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., No. 99-5226, 2004 WL 4963044 (R.I.
Super. Mar. 22, 2004) (severing all of the Defendants' third-party claim from the
trial).
233. Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., No. PC 99-5226 2007 R.I. Super.
Lexis 32 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2007) (Court's Decision).
234. A reference to the "cumulative presence" of these errors in the Rhode Island
record seems particularly apt because the trial court refused to allow the jury to con-
sider specific properties, but rather allowed them to find that a "public nuisance" ex-
isted solely on the basis of the "cumulative presence" of lead paint in residences in the
State. Jury Instructions from Rhode Island v Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., C.A. No. 99-
5226, *10, *14 (R.I. Super. issued Feb. 13, 2006); see also Rhode Island v. Lead Indus.
Ass'n, Inc., C.A. No. 99-5226, (R.I. Super. issued Nov. 23, 2004) (sustaining State's
Motion in Limine to exclude evidence concerning individual properties from trial);
Faulk and Gray, supra note 83, at 1188-92 (discussing the mosaic of errors in the
Rhode Island lead paint trial, many of which standing alone constitute reversible
error).
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The Rhode Island case is an extreme example of "alternative
liability"-especially extreme because all of the persons poten-
tially responsible for producing the risks plainly are not before the
court. As of this writing, the "Rhode Island" model, where public
officials and private contingent fee lawyers work together to bring
"public nuisance" lawsuits, has proliferated to Ohio, where six cit-
ies have now sued lead paint manufacturers for similar relief.235
Another such suit is pending in New Jersey.236 The trial of the
Wisconsin "market share" case is scheduled later this year, and
there is every reason to believe that Wisconsin's precedent will be
advanced in other states receptive to common law "flexibility." Ac-
cordingly, it appears that the "extreme" is rapidly becoming rou-
tine-and the "extraordinary" is now increasingly commonplace.
This curious style of "justice" is plainly wrong in a country
that takes pride in its belief that everyone is "presumed innocent
until proven guilty." Although our nation treasures the principle
that all persons are "equal in the eyes of the law," critics suggest
that some forums believe it is necessary to "tip the balance" with
carefully placed judicial thumbs. 237 In the American legal tradi-
tion, fairness is ensured when the party bringing the lawsuit has
the burden to prove their case. Fairness is also ensured by trial
and appellate judges who act as impartial referees-referees who
enforce fundamental rules and who do not create novel principles
that unjustly favor any particular party. Finally, fairness is as-
sured when public counsel perform their duties in accordance with
the public policy priorities previously declared by the executive
and legislative branches, rather than neglecting and departing
from those laws to advance creative "common law" theories at va-
riance with existing duties. Unless all of these individual fairness
guarantees work together in a manner designed by the govern-
ment's framers, we face an increasingly subjective system that
produces merely results, as opposed to justice. 238 When that oc-
235. Bob Driehaus, 6 Ohio Cities Rush to File Suits Against Makers of Lead Paint,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2007, at A12.
236. See Faulk and Gray, supra note 83, at 1194-95.
237. AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2006 28 (2006)
(referring to Rhode Island where it notes that a trial "court stripped the traditional
elements from public nuisance law to do an end-run around product liability law and
thereby create a defenseless lawsuit").
238. See Richard 0. Faulk, Armageddon Through Aggregation: The Use and Abuse
of Class Actions in International Dispute Resolution, 10 MICH. ST. - DCL J. INr'L L.
205, 236 (2001) (advising "caution" and "careful deliberations" in pursuit of poten-
tially oppressive judicial solutions, such as class actions in civil law nations, "lest by
risking Armageddon, we gain not justice, but merely results.").
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curs, our treasured system of justice is reduced to an exercise in
economics, in the same manner as the asbestos crisis, and due pro-
cess is reduced to a caricature and, ultimately, an illusion.239
While everyone-including these authors-agrees that young
innocent children need to be protected from unreasonable risks,
sacrificing one of the pillars of American tort law is the wrong way
to do so. The need for litigation-based "solutions" is belied by any
argument that maintains that the continued presence of lead in
residential homes is a societal problem, or that litigation-based
"solutions" are needed to address them, is belied by the hugely
successful efforts that have been undertaken by state legislatures
and regulatory agencies. As the figure below reflects, those efforts
have resulted in a great "success story" that reflects major and
substantial reductions in the number of children with elevated
lead blood levels-all achieved without any meaningful assistance
from the tort bar. 240
The average blood lead level of children under the age of six in
the U.S. in the early to mid-1970s was about 16.5 gg/dL. 241 While
many sources of lead may have contributed to this very high aver-
age blood lead level, it is generally accepted that the vast majority
of the lead came from tailpipe emissions from vehicles burning
leaded gasoline. 242 According to the most recent data available
(collected during 2001-2002), the average blood lead level for chil-
239. See Richard 0. Faulk, Dispelling the Myths of Asbestos Litigation: Solutions
for Common Law Courts, 44 S. Tex. L. Rev. 945, 946 (2003) (comparing the regular
practice of asbestos settlements through "voluntary" disposition without trial to the
"Cold War because it is also an economic struggle, not merely a struggle between
competing ideas").
240. CRITERIA DOCUMENT, supra note 115, at 4-21. Figure taken from CRITERIA
DOCUMENT, supra note 115, at 4-24, Fig. 4-3 ("Blood lead concentrations in U.S. chil-
dren, 1-5 years of age. Shown are geometric means and 95% confidence intervals as
reported from the NHANES 11 (1976-1980) and NHANES III Phase 1 (1988-1991);
Pirkle et al., (1994); NHANES III Phase 2 (1991-1994; J.L. Pirkle et al., (1998); and
NHANES IV (1999-2000, 2001-2002; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2005).")
241. William Kovarik, Ethyl-Leaded Gasoline: How a Classic Occupational Disease
Became an International Public Health Disaster, 11 INTL J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENvTL.
HEALTH 384, 394 (2005).
242. By 1996, when the phase-out of leaded gasoline was complete, the average
blood lead level for children under the age of six had dropped to 2.7 jgldL. Criteria
Document, supra note 115, at 4-21. This represents a steep decline (from 77.8% to
4.4%) of children who had blood lead levels above 10 gig/dL. CTR. FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Blood Lead Levels -
United States, 1999-2002, 54(20) MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 513-16
(May 27, 2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/
mm5420a5.htm#tabl [hereinafter 1999-2002 BLLs].
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dren in the U.S. continued to decrease to 1.70 gg/dL. 243 Thus, as a
consequence of the governmental intervention, the level of lead in
the blood of young children is 90 percent less today than it was 30
years ago.2 4 4
Despite this clear "success story," some towns, cities and even
state attorneys general are apparently dissatisfied with their
elected representatives' decisions and efforts. These plaintiffs are
asking the courts for additional relief-relief that amounts, for all
practical purposes, to absolute liability. In an increasing number
243. CRITERIA DOCUMENT, supra note 115, at 4-22.
244. It should be noted that while the State of Rhode Island was in trial against
the lead manufacturers on its "public nuisance" claims, the incidence of elevated blood
lead levels actually decreased below the State's regulatory standard for "elimination."
See R.I. DEPT. OF HEALTH, CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING IN RHODE ISLAND: THE NUM-
BERS 2007 EDITION, 4-5 (July 2007), available at http://www.health.ri.gov/leadl
databook2006_Databook.pdf. Despite these ongoing achievements, the State's coun-
sel actually argued to the jury that the levels had reached a "plateau" above these
levels and that the State could make no further progress without victory in the suit.
See Morning Trial Transcript, February 9, 2006, at 80. ("[W]e also know that in 2004
more than 1,100 Rhode Island children-there's actually 1,167 children, real children
with real families, who tested positive for lead poisoning .... We know that Rhode
Island has made great strides but that today too many children still have lead poison-
ing .... But if you'll remember what Dr. Shannon told you, he was asked if lead
poisoning and the treatment of lead poisoning was a public health success story, and
he said yes because the numbers have come down. But he said there's been a plateau
recently and that it is still a public health menace"); see also, Trial Transcript, Febru-
ary 9, 2006, at 173 ("Ladies and Gentlemen, we've reached a plateau. We've gone as
far as the secondary measures of enforcement and the screening program can take
us"). One must question why a public official would choose to ignore success and plead
disaster. Such a decision raises the question of whether victory in the lawsuit was
deemed more important than serving the public interest. See also Faulk and Gray,
supra note 83, 1180-83, 1181 n.647 (discussing ethical problems related to states hir-
ing of private lawyers on a contingency fee basis).
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of lawsuits, they seek more funding-and they are asking judges
to make the few remaining companies that formerly made lead
pigment and paint the insurers for an entire industry without any
regard to whether their products actually contributed to the harm.
To accomplish this result, which to date has been successfully ac-
complished by legislative action and executive enforcement, public
counsel (often joined by private counsel on a contingent fee ar-
rangement) insist that their "common law" theories are entirely
independent of public policies and procedures adopted by the very
agencies that created their offices. If a new "solution" is neces-
sary-and the evidence suggests it is not-the supposed "flexibil-
ity" of common law courts and remedies is not the answer.
Instead, the public officials should seek additional laws and, if ap-
propriate, additional funding from the legislature, or they should
seek new regulations from administrative agencies. Most impor-
tantly, they should pay attention to the public policies already in
existence and pursue them vigorously through existing laws in ac-
cordance with their sworn duties-a pursuit that should not be
abandoned in favor of protracted and speculative litigation while,
if their allegations are correct, children remain endangered for
years.
VII. CONCLUSION
The honored judicial principles that have traditionally allo-
cated the burden of proof in tort cases were not created "out of the
air." Instead, they are hallowed for a reason-because without
them, every citizen's liberty is imperiled, not just those who may
be unpopular. This principle is remarkably illustrated in Robert
Bolt's play, A Man for All Seasons. In a familiar passage, Sir
Thomas More is assailed with the charge that he would "give the
devil the benefit of law:"
MORE: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the
law to get after the devil?
ROPER: I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
MORE: Oh? ... And when the last law was down, and the Devil
turned round on you-where would you hide, Roper, the laws all
being flat?... This country's planted thick with laws from coast
to coast-man's laws, not God's-and if you cut them down...
d'you really think you could stand upright in the winds that
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would blow then? .. .Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for
my own safety's sake. 245
This dialogue is particularly relevant today, especially to
those cases that are filled with massive emotional appeal-such
as those involving children's health. It is, of course, at the ex-
tremes that the rigor and wisdom of the law is tested, and under
great stress, such extremes can produce the seeds of abuse that,
when fully grown, can threaten the fundamental values essential
to a free society. More than ever before, courts must be careful and
cautious before striking down traditional rules and replacing
them with new ideas that promise justice in "extraordinary cir-
cumstances"-especially when those ideas primarily arise from ec-
onomic considerations, as opposed to historical jurisprudence.
If legal history teaches us anything, it shows that the "ex-
traordinary" cannot be predictably contained. Even with the best
intentions, exceptions born of such circumstances often swallow
the rules they were so carefully structured to preserve. Courts
should therefore be especially vigilant when tempted to accept
principles that are contrary to centuries of experience to "correct"
an alleged contemporary "injustice." This vigilance is especially
relevant in lead paint litigation-where a candid appraisal of the
record demonstrates that the circumstances are only "extraordi-
nary" when reasonable alternatives to extremism have been arbi-
trarily disregarded.
245. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 66 (2d ed. 1962).
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